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CORPORATE CHARTERS WITH
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES
SHANN TURNBULL*
INTRODUCTION
Lawyers, and others, can play a fundamental role in achieving
competitive advantages through the drafiing of corporate charters
that forego the traditional Anglo theory of corporate governance.
This article will explore that proposition and illustrate how the
size and cost of government can be reduced by: (i) improving the
competitiveness of firms, and (ii) designing the charters of firms
* Shann Turnbull is a pioneer in the study and teaching of corporate governance.
He received a B.Sc. from Melbourne, an M.BA from Harvard Business School, and a
Dip. Elec. Eng. from Hobart. Mr. Turnbull is a founding fellow and life member of the
Australian Institute of Company Directors. In addition, he is an Honorary Senior
Fellow of the Corporate Directors' Association Limited, a Fellow of the Securities
Institute of Australia, the Australian Institute of Management, the Institute of
Chartered Secretaries and Administrators, and the Royal Society for the Arts. After
graduating from Harvard, Mr. Turnbull worked as an investment banker conducting
corporate mergers and acquisitions as well as an advisor to international corporations
and governments. Mr. Turnbull went on to found several enterprises and became
chairman of three publicly traded corporations. Currently, Mr. Turnbull is conducting
research at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia on the governance of social
institutions that utilize decentralized information and control architecture.
All works attributed herein to the author that are not widely available are on
file with the author. For information, please contact Shann Turnbull, P.O. Box 266,
Woollahra, Sydney, N.S.W. Australia, 1350 or via e-mail at sturnbull@mba1963.
hbs.edu.
The author would like to thank Professors Bernard Black and Charles Sabel for
the financial support which allowed this paper to be presented to the conference
they organized on "Alternative Perspectives on Corporate Governance" at Columbia
Law School, January 23, 1998. Many thanks also to the Editors of St. John's Law
Review for reformatting the paper and adding many additional notes and citations
to support and explain the text.
Since the paper was written in 1997, additional elements of the "Alternative
Perspective" presented in the article have been included in my survey article,
'Gouvernement d'entreprise:Th~ories, Enjeux et paradigmes' Gouvernance: Revenue
internationale, 1:1, pp. 11-43, 2000. The full text of the original English version of
'Corporate Governance: Theories, challenges and paradigms', can be downloaded
from <httpJ/papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstractid=221350>.
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and other social institutions to make them self-governing. This
alternative approach explored herein also provides a way to
outline elements of a cybernetic framework of analysis,' and shows
how this can be used to produce practicable results that are
testable by "normal science."2
As a contribution to the topic of alternatives to traditional
corporate governance, this article, however, does not necessarily
seek to present "normal science." Instead, this article will
establish: (i) how the study of social organizations can be grounded
in pure and applied science, and (ii) the potential of this approach
to explain complex institutional arrangements by considering some
empirical examples. In the interests of efficiency, this article
touches upon a number of my arguments only briefly, with
references to my various other papers, while other arguments are
more fully developed and grounded in various bodies of literature.
Another goal of this article is to encourage corporate
governance scholars to engage with pure and applied scientists
whose work is in the field of information and control theory.
Furthermore, I seek to encourage corporate governance scholars to
consider the analysis of sociologists who have identified four ways
in which transactions can be governed, rather than the two or
three recognized by most economists and organizational theorists.
There are many disciplines contributing to the study of corporate
governance with at least as many viable perspectives.3 As such,
1 See F. Heylighen et al., What are Cybernetics and Systems Science? (last modified
Oct. 27, 1999) <http'//pespmcl.vub.ac.be/cybswhat.html> (describing cybernetics as the
relatively new study of communication, control, and the determination of how systems
control their actions and communicate internally and externally); see also JIRI KLIR &
MIROSLAV VALACH, CYBERNETIC MODELLING 55-75 (W.A. Ainsworth ed., Pavel Dolan
trans., liffe Books Ltd. 1967) (describing the science of cybernetics).
2 THOMAs S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10 (3d ed. 1996)
("[Niormal science' means research firmly based upon one or more past scientific
achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges
for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice."); see also Robert A. Solo,
Boulding Among the Structuralists, 55 REV. SOC. ECON. 432, 435 (1997) (explaining
Kuhn's theory of normal science).
3 See Shann Turnbull, Corporate Governance: Its Scope, Concerns and Theories, 5
CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INTL REV. 180, 185 (1997) Full text at <http://cog.kent.edu/
lib/turnbull4.html> [hereinafter Turnbull, Corporate Governance] (discussing the
results of a survey on corporate governance that reviewed the ethnocentric nature of
corporate governance scholarship and its limitations stemming from being grounded on
an American-based theory of the firm); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham,
Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical Dimension of Global Corporate
Governance, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1134-43 (1999) (discussing different models of
corporate governance); Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in
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another objective herein is to invite consideration of a theory of the
firm based on the economizing of information processing required
by individuals. This theory recognizes that all human coordination
is based on an evolutionary hierarchy of communication channels,
which can be usefully divided into four categories, as set forth in
Figure 2.4
Objectives of Good Corporate Governance
Good corporate governance includes enhancing corporate
performance.5  To accomplish this, governance systems and
processes are required that minimize fraud and malpractice and
provide information and control mechanisms. Such systems and
processes can increase the operating capability of the business and
the degree to which such capabilities can be utilized.
6
Accomplishing good corporate governance necessitates reducing
the duties of directors and simplifying their responsibilities
through the division and specialization of tasks so as to reduce
their liabilities.7  This can be achieved by establishing an
appropriate division of powers in the corporate charter in order to
Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927, 1928-35 (1993)
(discussing differences in theory and perspective within corporate structures in the
United States, Germany, and Japan).
4 See infra fig. 2 app. at 157; Shann Turnbull, Impact of Mining Royalties on
Aboriginal Communities in the Northern Territory: First Report, at 52, Parl. Paper No.
135 (Oct. 1977) (Austl.) (report submitted to the Hon. IA. Viner, Minister for
Aboriginal Affairs, as Austrl. Parliament Papers 135/1978); Shann Turnbull,
Stakeholder Democracy: Redesigning the Governance of Firms and Bureaucracies, 23 J.
SOC. ECO. 325 (1994) [hereinafter Turnbull, Democracy].
5 See Shann Turnbull, Governance Flaws and Remedies, Corporate Directors'
Diploma Course, Univ. of New England, Armidale, Austl., Topic 7.2, at 14 (1994)
[hereinafter Turnbull, Diploma Course] (describing the necessary elements of good
corporate governance); see also The Business Roundtable, Statement on Corporate
Governance (visited Feb. 15, 2000) <http'//www.brtable.orgpdffll.pdf>.
[Tlhe principal objective of a business enterprise is to generate economic
returns to its owners. Although the link between the forms of governance
and economic performance is debated . . . good corporate governance
practices provide an important framework for a timely response by a
corporation's board of directors to situations that may directly affect
stockholder value.
Id. at 1.
6 See Turnbull, Diploma Course, supra note 5 at 14.
7 See id.; see also The Business Roundtable, supra note 5, at 4 (discussing how the
board of directors "delegates to management the authority and responsibility for
managing the everyday affairs of the corporation," and noting that "[t ]he extent of this
delegation varies depending on the size and circumstances of the corporation").
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create what is called a compound board.8  Good corporate
governance also includes protecting the reputations of both
directors and the enterprise. This is accomplished by establishing
an inclusive information and control system that (i) minimizes
communication losses, delays, and distortion while enhancing
meaning and responsiveness; (ii) minimizes conflicts of self-
interest and mediates any remaining conflicts in a way that
provides both accountability and transparency; and (iii) constantly
monitors the operating integrity and effectiveness of all
information and control systems.9 Furthermore, allowing the
corporation to become a good citizen by establishing processes for
becoming aware of and responsive to community, environmental,
and social concerns contributes to good corporate governance.10
This article presents arguments and empirical examples
establishing that corporate charters, which introduce an
appropriate division of power, provide a way for corporations to
unilaterally achieve the objectives of good corporate governance. A
division of power can also be established externally through
shareholder relationships. Thus, the term "compound board" will
be used to describe either arrangement for creating a division of
power.
Compound boards are commonly created in Australia through
a multinational company, or a family interest, that controls a local
publicly-traded enterprise. This situation is also found throughout
Asia and Europe. Two thirds of the Paris Bourse falls under the
verrouillage system, to create a compound board, as do the
"Chinese boxes" found in Italy." Compound boards are also
8 See Turnbull, Diploma Course, supra note 5 at 14, see also Shann Turnbull, Self-
Regulation, Address Before the Ninth International Conference on Socio-Economics,
University of Montreal (July 6, 1997) [hereinafter Turnbull, Self-Regulation] ("The
division of powers in a... compound board not only introduces checks and balances but
a division of decision-making labour ... It allows the information needed to be provided
to, and processed by, individuals in control centres to be economised [sic] .... ").
9 See Turnbull, Diploma Course, supra note 5, at 14; see also ADA DEMB & F.
FRIEDRICH NEUBAUER, THE CORPORATE BOARD: CONFRONTING THE PARADOXES, 88-97
(1992) (discussing monitoring and control systems within corporate governance).
10 See Turnbull, Diploma Course, supra note 5, at 14; see also Business for Social
Responsibility, Introduction to Corporate Social Responsibility (visited Feb. 15, 2000)
<http://www.bsr.org/resourcecenter/index-html> (underscoring the concept of corporate
social responsibility that "generally refers to business decision-making linked to ethical
values, compliance with legal requirements, and respect for people, communities and
the environment").
1 See A New Study on Corporate Governance in the G7Is Released Today, OXFORD
ANALYTICA DAILY BRIEF, Oct. 13, 1992 (on file with author).
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created when shareholders meet in a supervisory board capacity as
in a Japanese Keiretsu or a leveraged buy-out association. 12
Furthermore, under the broad definition of a compound board, one
can be created in effect by an active and influential "relationship"
investor taking an aggressive interest in the corporate governance
of the firm it has invested in.
Additional Considerations
Section I considers the limitations of economic analysis and
outlines the alternative theoretical framework presented in this
article. This alternative framework is grounded in the
characteristics of individuals, including their ability to process
information, and identifies four evolutionary stages in human
channels of communications. In a somewhat analogous typology,
four different institutional governance mechanisms are recognized:
(i) clans and communities; (ii) associations and networks; (iii)
hierarchies; and (iv) markets. Section I concludes by considering
how the cybernetic framework can provide a common foundation
for other theories of the firm, as well as other organizations in
general, with an outline of the paradigm shift this foundation
creates.
Section II considers the practical problems of governing
publicly-traded corporations without the use of a compound board.
These problems include (i) conflicts of self-interest created by
centralized power; (ii) managing corruption and corruption of
corporate performance; (iii) communication errors; (iv) information
overload; and (iv) lack of a self-correcting, or even a self-checking,
information and control system. At the conclusion of Section II,
gaps in corporate governance scholarship are considered.
Section III presents cybernetic arguments 13 that support the
use of compound boards which introduce a network of information
and control centers. The advantages of such networks are their
ability to provide (i) distributed intelligence to reduce both
information overload and bounded rationality;,14 (ii) a multiplicity
12 Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of
Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 869 (1993) (highlighting the governance
structure and benefits of an LBO association).
13 See supra note 1. Cybernetics is the "science of communication and control
theory that is concerned esp[ecially] with the comparative study of automatic control
systems (as the nervous system and brain and mechanical-electrical communication
systems)." MERRIAMI-WEBSTER'S COTE GIATE DICTIONARY 287 (10th ed. 1997).
14 See Roy Radner, Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing, 30 J. ECON.
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of information channels in order to obtain inclusive feedback
information with sufficient variety to correct errors, biases, and
omissions; and (iii) distributed control (requisite variety) to
manage complex operating variables. Cybernetic laws explain why
self-regulation and self-governance are not possible with
centralized control through use of unitary boards and/or regulatory
agencies. The cybernetic concept of amplification, however,
explains how this problem can be overcome to simplify the role of
directors and regulators in general.'5
Section IV uses the theoretical framework of Section I in order
to illustrate how the problems of a unitary board16 can be overcome
through a corporate charter that provides controllers (i.e., a board
of directors) with the knowledge, will, and power to act. For
example, the ability of directors to obtain the knowledge to act,
independent of management, can be accomplished through the
establishment of Stakeholder Councils.' 7 The ability of some
directors to obtain the will to act, independently of a major
shareholder, is achieved by electing directors through preferential
LITERATURE 1382, 1384 (1992) (alluding to bounded rationality as a limit on a person's
capabilities for information processing and decision-making); see also OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 21
(1975) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, MARKETS] (stating that "[blounded rationality
involves neurophysiological limits on the one hand and language limits on the other").
15 See Albert Gore, The Technology Challenge: What is the Role of Science in
American Society?, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for
the Advancement of Science (Feb. 12, 1996) (transcript available at
<http'//aaas.org/meetings/gore.htm>) (discussing the importance of knowledge and
communication in society); see also W. ROSS ASHBY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
CYBERNETICS 265 (1961) [hereinafter ASHBY, CYBERNETICS] (defining the cybernetic
concept of amplification as "a device that, if given a little of something, will emit a lot of
it").
16 See Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization, in THE NATURE
OF THE FIM ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 90, 105-06 (Oliver E.
Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991) (describing the unitary board form as a
centralized and functionally departmentalized operation incapable of managing the
complexities associated with growth (citing ALFRED CHANDLER JR., STRATEGY AND
STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 382-83
(1962))); see also Shann Turnbull, Competitiveness and Corporate Governance, 2 CORP.
GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L REV. 80, 81-83 (1994) [hereinafter Turnbull, Competitiveness]
(examining the problems associated with the unitary form of corporate control);
Turnbull, Self-Regulation, supra note 8; Richard M. Buxbaum, Institutional Owners
and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 44 (1991).
17 See Shann Turnbull, Self-Governance and World Governance: Necessary
Partners (visited Sept. 17, 1999) <http'//www.worldcitizen.orgissuesjunjul96/self-
gov.html> [hereinafter Turnbull, World Governance] (describing how stakeholder
councils support directors by establishing qualitative and quantitative performance
standards independent of management).
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(cumulative) voting.'8 The ability of some directors to prevent
management from misusing their powers and/or appointing new
directors is achieved through the establishment of a Corporate
Senate.' 9 The division of power in these ways simplifies the roles
of directors while improving their effectiveness. This is best
illustrated by considering the operations of Japanese Keiretsu
firms20 and Spanish Mondrag6n firms.21 Section IV concludes by
considering the opportunities to simplify and/or privatize some of
the roles of government through the introduction of compound
boards.
The Conclusion points out that an increasing number of firms
with unitary boards are becoming employee-controlled. This may
be viewed as a positive development, but such firms are not
Is See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New
Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 174 (1994) ("[The institutional use
of cumulative voting, which buttresses director independence and accountability, will
strengthen the board's ability to prod management in valuable ways.").
19 See Turnbull, Competitiveness, supra note 16, at 80 (characterizing a corporate
senate as a supervisory committee with veto power over any decision in which directors
have a conflict of interest). Corporate senates function as an oversight panel and are
comprised of senators elected on the basis of one vote per shareholder. See id. The
corporate senate is independent of the board of directors, and its members must not
have any operational interests in the corporation. See id.; see also Shann Turnbull, A
Whistle-Blowing Senate for Companies (visited Feb. 15, 2000)
<http'//www.globalideasbankorg(1993/1993-58.HTML> (describing the concept of a
corporate senate). See generally Shann Turnbull, Improving Corporate Structure and
Ethics: A Case for Corporate Senates, 17 DIRECTOR'S MONTHLY 1, 1-4 (1993)
[hereinafter Turnbull, Structure and Ethics]. Full text at
<http://wvw.worldbank.org/devforum/files/struc-and-eth.pdf>.
20 See, e.g., Kai Schadbach, The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental
European View, 16 B.U. INTL L.J. 331, 410-11 (1998) ("[The] Keiretsu is the Japanese
system of cross-shareholding between related corporations, both vertically and
horizontally, with a core bank that advances relationships between the members.")
(footnotes omitted); see also Michael R. Czinkota, Distribution in Japan: Problems and
Changes, in JAPANESE BUSINESS: CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 299, 302-04 (Subhash
Durlabhji & Norton E. Marks eds., 1993) (discussing the Keiretsu); Ronald Dore &
Hugh Whittaker, Introduction, in BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN: VIEWS OF LEADING
JAPANESE ECONOMISTS 1, 9-11 (Kenichi Imai & Ryutaro Komiya eds., Ronald Dore &
Hugh Whittaker trans., 1994).
21 See, e.g., William F. Whyte, The Mondrag6n Cooperatives in 1976 and 1998, 52
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 478, 478 (1999) (extolling the success of the Mondrag6n
system of corporations). The Mondrag6n name is derived from the town in the Basque
provinces of northern Spain, where the first small producer's cooperative was formed.
See id. at 479. The Mondrag6ns are employee-owned and controlled economic
cooperatives. See id.; see also WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE & KATHLEEN KING WHYTE,
MAKING MONDRAG6N: THE GROWTH AND DYNAMICS OF THE WORKER COOPERATIVE
COMPLEX (1988); ROY MORRISON, WE BUILD THE ROAD AS WE TRAVEL 3-4,8-35 (1991)
(discussing the Mondrag6n system).
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sustainable without a compound board. The evidence indicates
that compound boards do not necessarily increase costs, and that
they are a condition precedent for establishing competitive self-
governing charters for firms, as well as other forms of social
institutions. Self-governing firms minimize the cost and the size of
government while improving the quality and efficiency of corporate
democracy. Attaining this objective depends, in large part, upon
legal educators and commentators supporting the concept of the
compound board and their instruction of both lawyers and
students of the law on how to craft corporate charters with an
appropriate compound board.
I. OUTLINE OF ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Limitations in Economic Analysis
Many economists have failed to recognize that there are
alternative ways of organizing transactions outside the markets
and hierarchy model or the hegemony of a market ideology. This
failure has resulted in there being no accepted theoretical
framework for comparing systems of corporate governance within
or between cultures.22 The problem being "fac[ed] ... of developing
a viable theory of organizations"23 is exacerbated by the fact that
there is no "theoretical research to date that compares the relative
efficiency of hierarchical and non-hierarchical organizations within
a common model.2 4
This problem of organization has been identified by a number
of leading researchers in the field 25 who acknowledge that there is
22 See DEMB & NEUBAUER, supra note 9, at 16-17.
In an era when companies and corporate activity shape the contours of
physical, economic, and social environments to an overwhelming degree,
existing "ideologies" regarding the relationship between corporate activity
and social welfare appear inadequate... [Tihe profound and ubiquitous
impacts of multinational and global businesses seem to demand that
responsible leaders reexamine the fundamental assumptions on which the
structures for corporate governance rest today.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Shann Turnbull, Governance Options-Beyond Markets
and Hierarchies (visited Feb 15, 2000) <http'//www.worldservice.orgissues/decjan96/
governance.html> (emphasizing the shortsightedness of economics in clinging to the
hierarchical and market models of governance, and suggesting ways to develop
alternatives to these theories).
23 Jensen, supra note 12, at 873.
24 Radner, supra note 14, at 1384.
25 See D.C. North, Transaction Costs in History, 4 J. EUR. HIST. 552, 557 (1985)
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a need for "a more comprehensive theory."26 Nevertheless, such a
theory must be well-grounded because mere "theory is outrunning
our knowledge of the facts in the study of industrial organization
and . . . more empirical work is required if we are to make
progress."27 The "recent work - of team theory (Alchian and
Demsetz, 1972), agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and
transaction cost kinds - has not gone far enough."28 As such, it has
been said that a "more complete theory of the firm must give
greater weight to information cost than is given either in Coase's
theory or in theories based on shirking and opportunism."29
Economists Sidney G. Winter and Harold Demsetz have
emphasized the importance of the acquisition of knowledge and its
utilization in future work on the theory of the firm.3° It is clear,
however, that limitations still exist with respect to economic
analysis, and that more work is necessary in this area.
B. Human Information Processing and Behavior
Human behavior can be both variable and contradictory
because environmental messages and stimuli can produce
behavioral changes.31 This is illustrated in Figure 1,32 which
identifies and contrasts the characteristics of real people and
theoretical "economic" people. The characteristics identified in
items two, six, seven, and nine of Figure 1 explicitly depend upon
(noting that there is an additional dimension currently missing in the discipline of
economics); Oliver E. Williamson, Introduction, in INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, i, xi
(Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1990) (quoting Herbert Simon's request for "observing the
phenomena at a higher level of resolution).
26 Ronald IL Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Influence, in THE NATURE OF THE
FIIAI: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 16, at 61, 72.
27 Ronald H. Coase, Contracts and the Activities of Firms, 34 J.L. & ECON. 451,
451 (1991). It has been further noted that there is an additional dimension currently
missing in the discipline of economics. See North, supra note 25, at 559. Moreover,
there is a need for observing the phenomena at a higher level of resolution. See
Williamson, supra note 25, at xi.
2s Oliver E. Williamson, Introduction, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM= ORIGINS,
EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 16, at 10.
29 Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, in THE NATURE OF THE
FIRM ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 16, at 159.
30 See Williamson, supra note 28, at 11. See generally Sidney G. Winter, On Coase,
Competence, and the Corporation, in THE NATURE OF THE F]RUI ORIGINS, EVOLUTION,
AND DEVELOPMIENT, supra note 16, at 179; Demsetz, supra note 29, at 171-75.
31 See DEM1B & NEUBAUER, supra note 9, at 17.
32 See infra fig. 1 app. at 156 (citing A.J. Wearing, Economic Growth: Magnificent
Obsession, Address Before the 44th Australian & New Zealand Association for the
Advancement of Science Congress in Perth, Australia (Aug. 1973)).
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information gathering.33 Figure 1 also helps to explain the
conflicting research findings concerning agency theory and
stewardship theory.34 Agency theory assumes that managers will
appropriate shareholder value to further their own pecuniary and
non-pecuniary self-interests.35 Conversely, stewardship theory
assumes that managers act selflessly in the best interests of
investors.36 Items one through five in Figure 1 suggest that the
same person could act either as a self-interested agent or a selfless
steward.37 Item seven suggests that human behavior is contingent
upon social environment, while item eight indicates that, within
the same environment, different people could act in different
ways.38
Item two refers to what the micro-economic literature
describes as "bounded rationality."39 The genesis of this concept
was the recognition that the "problem of a rational economic order
is trivial in the absence of bounded rationality limits on human
decision makers."40 This formulation explicitly recognizes that the
design of social institutions is dependent upon the ability of people
to process information. Information overload creates design limits
for the information and control architecture of an organization
and, if present, may require "change in [the] organizational
structure."4'
33 See id.
34 See L. Donaldson & J.H. Davis, Boards and Company Performance: Research
Challenges the Conventional Wisdom, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L REV. 151, 151-
60 (1994).
35 See Michael C. Jensen & W.H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,305-60 (1976).
36 See id.
37 See infra fig. 1 app. at 156.
38 See id.
39 "Bounded rationality" refers to the ability of human agents to act, in some
degree, in a rational manner, while recognizing that biological and language limitations
present difficulties to completely rational behavior. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS supra note
14, at 21. This formulation, therefore, may be described as referring to "human
behavior that is 'intendedly rational, but only limitedly so.' "Id. (emphasis in original)
(quoting HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR xxiv (1961) ). The
neurophysical limitations on human behavior consist of "limits on the powers of
individuals to receive, store, retrieve, and process information without error." Id. In
addition, language limits often prevent individuals from articulating their knowledge to
others in conventional ways, thus requiring the aid of demonstrations or "learning-by-
doing" to overcome language difficulties. Id. at 22.
40 Id. at 5; see also FA. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON.
REV. 519, 527 (1945).
41 WILLIAMSON, MARKETS, supra note 14, at 46.
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Similar to computers, humans have physical limitations on
their ability to receive, store, process, and transmit information.
42
The "efficient processing of information is an important and
related concept" to transaction costs in an organization.
43
Therefore, using information, rather than cost as a unit of
analysis, is more useful 4 because it allows for the observation of
the "phenomena at a higher level of resolution;"45 provides an
"additional dimension to analyses;"46 gives "greater weight to
information cost[s];" 47 and is based on knowledge and know-how.48
The governance of transactions through a market or hierarchy
model is dependent upon obtaining the necessary information to
organize the transactions in the most economic manner.49 In this
context, transaction costs are both created and represented by
information. The social construct of cost represents a surrogate for
the physical capture of information by decision-makers.
Institutional arrangements that economize the need for, and
capture of, information will also economize cost. As a result of
bounded rationality, "the problem of organization is precisely one
of decomposing the enterprise in efficient information processing
respects."50 An information processing interpretation has been
advanced to explain why the structure of firms changed earlier
this century as they grew larger and more complex.51 As the
42 See id. at 21.
43 Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of
Transactional Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 234 (1979).
4See Demsetz, supra note 29, at 159. "But for the limited ability of human agents
to receive, store, retrieve, and process data, interesting economic problems vanish."
Williamson, supra note 43, at 234 n.5.
45 Williamson, supra note 25, at xi.
46 North, supra note 25, at 572.
47 Demsetz, supra note 29, at 159.
48 See Winter, supra note 30, at 189-90 (asserting that a fundamental
characteristic of a business firm is its possession, retention, and use of knowledge
despite frequent changes in personnel).
49 See, e.g., Ronald L Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, in THE NATURE OF
THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 16, at 48, 48-60;
Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization, in THE NATURE OF THE
FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 16, at 90.
50 OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 283 (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON,
CAPITALJSMI (citations omitted).
51 See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE
HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE 378 (1962) (analyzing the methods and
strategies employed by some of the largest U.S. industrial enterprises in expanding
their business and altering their corporate structure, and concluding that "both the
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"operations of the enterprise became too complex and the problems
of coordination, appraisal, and policy formulation too intricate for a
small number of top officers to handle both long-run,
entrepreneurial, and short-run operational administrative
activities," a new corporate structure was required.52 This change
in organizational structure from the unitary form to multi-
divisional form was seen as a method to economize the information
processing load on executives.53
The limitations of bounded rationality are resolved by
adopting a multidivisional form structure, where information
processing is economized by the decomposition of decision-making
into short-run operational and long-term strategic concerns.54
Short-run disturbances of degree are managed in the appropriate
division, while long-run strategic disturbances are managed by the
head office.55 Interestingly, this same arrangement is found in
humans, in that local nerve centers immediately activate limbs
when exposed to pain, while the "head office," the brain, activates
operational activities... and the entrepreneurial ones... called for the adoption of the
new structure"); WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 50, at 280 (noting that the
"organizational strain of trying to cope with economic adversity under the old
structure" was the impetus for innovating the corporate structures of Du Pont and
General Motors, among others).
52 WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 50, at 280 (quoting Alfred D. Chandler,
Jr.).
53 A multi-divisional corporation, "M-form," is distinguished from the unitary form,
"U-form," in that it involves the "creation of semiautonomous operating divisions...
organized along product, brand, or geographic lines. The operating affairs of each [are]
managed separately [by] ... a general office... to monitor divisional performance,
allocate resources among divisions, and engage in strategic planning." Id. at 281. The
U-form structure, on the other hand, is centralized and organized based on corporate
functional activities, such as manufacturing, marketing, and finance. See id. at 320.
Therefore, executives in the U-form structure have a much greater information
processing load because they are responsible for both the "destiny of the entire
enterprise" and for "more routine operational activities." Id. at 281 (quoting Alfred D.
Chandler, Jr.). Conversely, executives in the M-form structure are freed from routine
corporate activities, which gives them the "time, information, and even psychological
commitment for long-term planning and appraisal." Id. (quoting Alfred D. Chandler,
Jr.).
54 See id. The M-form structure accommodates the constraints of bounded
rationality by bifurcating the decision-making process into an operational part and a
strategic part. See id. at 282. The operational part responds to short-term needs of the
organization and makes decisions within existing rules. See id. The "repertoire" of the
operational part, however, is limited, "which is a concession to bounded rationality," so
that it does not have the resources to respond to long-term needs. Id. The strategic
part, on the other hand, which is free from the responsibility of routine activities, has
the ability to develop new rules to respond to long-term needs. See id.
55 See id. at 282-83.
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strategic avoidance action. This is illustrated by the fact that
"[elvolutionary systems that are subject to such bimodal
disturbances will, under natural selection, necessarily develop two
readily distinguishable feedbacks."56
C. Four Evolutionary Channels of Human Communication
Human evolution has produced four levels of specialization in
the use of the five senses for communication.57 All methods for
governing or coordinating human activities are based on a mixture
of one or more of these four channels. Different cultures use
different mixes, and these change over time.58 The information
transmitted by each channel can vary considerably. For example,
voice communication can transmit data at approximately one
hundred bits per second or baud.59 Tactile communications, which
include touch, taste, and smell, are processed at less than thirteen
bits per second.60 Meanwhile, the optic nerve is capable of
receiving data at one billion bits per second.61 Regardless, the data
per second, or baud rate, may not correlate with the level of
meaning or understanding.62 Parallel processing63 does allow the
56 Id. at 282 (citation omitted).
57 See infra fig. 2 app. at 157 (illustrating the four levels of specialization); Shann
Turnbull, The Application of Knowledge in Governing Society, Address Before the
International Conference on Knowledge, Economy and Society at the University of
Montreal (July 3, 1997) [hereinafter Turnbull, Governing Society] (manuscript on file
with author).
58 See Shann Turnbull, Stakeholder Democracy: Redesigning the Governance of
Firms and Bureaucracies, 23 J. SOCIO-ECON. 321, 328 (1994); Shann Turnbull, Impact
of Mining Royalties on Aboriginal Communities in the Northern Territory: First Report,
at 52, Parl. Paper No. 135 (Oct. 1977) (Austl.).
59 See E-mail message from P. Cochrane, <http/www.labs.bt.com/peoplet
cochrap/> Head of Research, British Telecom to Shann Turnbiull, Macquarie University
(Dec. 21, 1997) (on fie with author); see also P. Cochrane, 'Hard Drive: Band width and
brandwidth, Telegraph, April 6, London 2000, <http/www.telegraph.co.uk.SO/et?ac=
0027812357018 07&rtmo-wA0eAK5b&atmo=99999999&pg=/et/00/4/6/ecrhard06.html>.
60 See id.
61 See id.
62 For example, if a parent is having a conversation on the phone and her child
asks a question at the same time, the parent may lose track of the conversation and the
child's question, even though she realizes that both are occurring at the same time. See
Samuel I-L Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 105, 140 n.92 (1996).
As such, information is received, but not processed.
63 Parallel processing involves "forming a synthesis of several bits of information"
at the same time. Sarah B. Duncan, Pursuing Quality: Writing a Helpful Brief, 30 ST.
MARYS L.J. 1093, 1117 (1999). Serial processing, on the other hand, involves taking
information one bit at a time, running it through a single processing unit "which
performs certain analytic tasks," and producing a new form of information. Pillsbury,
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human brain to operate much more quickly, but still not as fast as
its ability to receive information.64 Social institutions, therefore,
need to be designed to recognize such neurophysiological limits.65
The pattern of information and control channels in a social
institution constitute its cybernetic architecture. Similarly, the
efficiency and effectiveness of computers and their chips are
dependent upon their architecture. 66 Both the efficiency and
effectiveness of a computer's ability to perform different tasks can
be improved by adopting specialized architectures for particular
applications.67
The legal constitutions of institutions are important, albeit not
the only, determinants of the social architecture and the efficacy of
their governance. Unfortunately, corporate charters are rarely
considered as variables for establishing competitive advantages.
The Mondrag6n firms, however, provide an outstanding example of
corporate constitutions that are designed to establish strategic
relationships. 68
D. Four Ways of Governing Society
There are "four distinctive forms of governance: markets,
hierarchies, the clan or community, and associations."69 All
institutional arrangements for coordinating social activities,
however, must rely on the channels of communication and control
identified in Figure 2.70 The four forms of governance7' are
characterized by the channels based on prices, voice/word, sensory,
and semiotics. Although each form of governance may be
characterized by a different channel, in practice, there is a mixture
supra note 62, at 144.
6 See Cochrane, supra note 59. For example, a single peripheral neuron is limited
to about ten baud.
65 See WHLIAMSON, MARKETS, supra note 14, at 21 (noting that economic models
often do not adequately take account of such limits on human agents).
66 See Gore, supra note 15 (describing the change in computer design from the
beginning of the mainframe era to the modem massive parallelism architecture).
67 See id. (noting that modem computer architecture, called massive parallelism,
is more effective at solving most problems than an older design).
68 See Turnbull, Self-Regulation, supra note 8 (providing tables and figures that
illustrate their scheme).
69 J. Rogers Hollingsworth & Leon N. Lindberg, The Governance of the American
Economy: The Role of Markets, Hierarchies, and Associative Behavior, in PRIVATE
INTEREsT GOVERNMENT: BEYOND MARKET AND STATE 221, 221-22 (Wolfgang Streeck
& Philippe C. Schmitter eds., 1985) (on file with author).
70 See infra fig. 2 app. at 157.
71 See Hollingsworth & Lindberg, supra note 69.
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of channels. As such, Ronald H. Coase, was asking and answering
the wrong question.7 2  Instead of inquiring why economic
transactions are organized through the "authority system" of a
firm, rather than through the market, he should have asked, why
are economic transactions organized by any combination of the
four different ways in which transactions can be governed?
The existence of four modes of organizing human cooperation
means that existing theories of the firm are incomplete.7 3 This
does not necessarily mean that existing theories of the firm are
incorrect, only that they may have limited application in a way
that is analogous to how Newton's laws of motion provide correct
answers when the effects of relativity are not present.7 4 In other
words, the theory of the firm becomes most relevant in cultures
that are committed to competition with strong anti-trust laws,
have large, impersonal publicly-traded firms without related party
transactions; have little bonding of stakeholders through cultural,
clan, trade, industry, vocational, or other associations, including
strong interlocking directorships. In effect, this theory of the firm
is characteristic of the U.S. economy. 75
The U.S.-based theory of the firm becomes less relevant when
economic transactions are mediated by cultural priorities, business
related associations, or trade, vocational, family, social, and
political networks. These attributes are more prominent in
continental Europe, Japan, and other Asian countries.7 6  The
72 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm (1937), in THE NATURE
OF THE FIRM ORIGINs, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 16, at 18 (arguing
that "a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only realistic in that it
corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is tractable by... the idea
of the margin and that of substitution, together giving the idea of substitution at the
margin") (footnote and citation omitted).
73 See Shann Turnbull, Beyond Markets and Hierarchies: Extending the Theory of
the Firm, Address Before the Conference of Economists (Sept. 28, 1994) (on file with
author).
74 See SIR IsAAc NEWTON'S MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLEs OF NATURAL PHILOsOPHY
AND HIS SYSTEM OF THE WORLD 7 (Florian Cajori ed. & Andrew Motte trans., 4th prtg.
1960) (defining the difference between absolute and relative motion).
75 See Geoffrey Miller, Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Some Points
of Contrast Between the United States and England, 1998 COLUDL BUS. L. REv. 51, 51
(1998) (contrasting American firms with those of Germany and Japan, and noting that
American firms are characterized by "a regime of explicit contracts and free-standing
firms," and opposition to "employee codetermination7).
76 See J. Rogers Hollingsworth, Continuities and Changes in Social Systems of
Production: The Cases of Japan, Germany, and the United States, in CONTEMPORARY
CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS 265 (J. Rogers Hollingsworth &
Robert Boyer eds., 1997) (arguing that different forms of governance "cannot easily [be]
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effect, however, of social priorities on the U.S. market is not
insignificant.77 This feature is ignored by most economists as
being either irrational or outside the discipline of markets and
hierarchies.
Empirical research by corporate governance scholars in other
disciplines has implicitly confirmed the perspective of
Hollingsworth, Lindberg, Schmitter, and Streeck.78 Some of the
empirical research was commissioned in the 1980s by the U.S.
Competitiveness Policy Council, which was formed to address
concerns that U.S. firms were not as competitive as Japanese and
German firms.79 This led U.S. corporate governance scholars to
study other cultures at the beginning of the 1990s. One result was
a report by Michael Porter in 1992 recommending reform of the
U.S. system of corporate ownership and control so that it would
more closely follow the practices of other cultures.80
transferred from one society to another" because they are embedded in the social
systems of each particular country); Leon N. Lindberg et al., Economic Governance and
the Analysis of Structural Change in the American Economy, in GOVERNANCE OF THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY 3 (John L. Campbell et al. eds., 1991) (explaining how changes in
the institutions that govern economic activity occurred with respect to different
industries); Capitalism, Sectors, Institutions, and Performance, in GOVERNING
CAPITALIST ECONOMIES 3-16 (J. Rogers Hollingsworth et al. eds., 1994); A New Study
on Corporate Governance in the G7 Is Released Today, supra note 11.
77 See SEVERYN T. BRUYN, A FUTURE FOR THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: THE SOCIAL
MARKET 171 (1991) (noting that the market is often seen as motivated by economic
ends, but functions within society because it "always serves a broader purpose").
78 See supra note 76 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 79-80 and
accompanying text.
79 See 15 U.S.C. § 4801(a)(1)(AXiii) (1994) (stating that among the Congressional
purposes for establishing the Competitiveness Policy Council was the need to obtain
information about the "competitive strategies of foreign competitors"); see also Ronald
J. Gilson, Reflections in a Distant Mirror: Japanese Corporate Governance Through
American Eyes, 1998 COLUM. BUS L. REV. 203, 203-05 (1998) (describing the disparity
between U.S. and Japanese corporate governance during the 1980s); Marleen A.
O'Connor, Rethinking Corporate Financial Disclosure of Human Resource Values for
the Knowledge-Based Economy, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. 527, 530 (1998)
(linking disclosure of information, used as a tool of governance, to encourage investing
and thus bolster competitiveness).
80 See MICHAEL E. PORTER, CAPITAL CHOICES: CHANGING THE WAY AMERICA
INVESTS IN INDUSTRY (1992). Porter's recommendations are supported by U.S.
economists Margaret M. Blair and Mitsuhiro Fukao, both of the Brookings Institution.
See generally MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 321-22 (1995)
(encouraging American corporations to consider greater employee ownership, among
other corporate governance reforms); MITSUHIRO FUKAO, FINANCIAL INTEGRATION,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND THE PERFORMANCE OF MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES 72,
72 (1995) (noting that "globalization of production processes and the integration of
world financial markets" exert pressure to change the structures of corporate
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E. Alternative Framework
The concerns and limitations of economic analysis based on
economizing costs can be overcome by an analysis based on
economizing information-processing by individuals.81 In this way,
insights developed from economic analysis can be extended to all
types of social institutions, including those where costs may have
little or no relevance.82 The grounds for using information, rather
than cost, as a unit of analysis arises from the foundations upon
which the theory of the firm was established.8 3
Once the relevant prices are discovered, however, they alone
cannot adequately communicate the qualitative aspects of a
transaction.8 4  Before a transaction is executed or avoided,
information is required about the nature of the goods or services,
the timing and terms of the exchange, and the trustworthiness of
the parties involved.8 5  In fact, "exchange relationships are
governance); see also Martin Lipton et al, Corporate Governance in the Era of
Institutional Ownership, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1144 (1995) (reviewing MARGARET M.
BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995)).
8, See SHANN TURNBULL, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF ABORIGINAL
COMArNITIS IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORiES: A STUDY IN TWO PARTS 6 (1980)
(describing Aboriginal society as a model of a social institution that ignores costs).
82 See fig. 3 app. at 158 (outlining the paradigm shift introduced by this approach,
which offers a practical solution to the issue of how to compare differently-structured
boards); see also DEMB & NEUBAUER, supra note 9, at 7.
83 See Coase, supra note 72, at 21 ("The most obvious cost of 'organizing'
production through the price mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices
are. This cost may be reduced but it will not be eliminated by the emergence of
specialists who will sell this information.") (footnotes omitted). In other words,
according to the theory of market failure, firms exist because markets fail to
communicate information as efficiently as organizations. In addition, the "costs of
negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction which
takes place on a market must also be taken into account." Id. (footnote omitted). It is
possible to reduce both of these costs by enlisting the services of professionals, but they
cannot be eliminated. See id. The price may effect the cost of production in ways
unrelated to just discovering the price. It has been postulated that higher prices imply
less pressure on workers, leading to a more sheltered environment. See HARVEY
LEIBENSTEIN, INSIDE THE FIRM THE INEFFICIENCIES OF HIERARCHY 132 (1987). This
results in a more sheltered environment that promotes lower effort and higher
production costs. See id.
84 See William G. Ouchi, Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans, 25 ADMIN. SCI. Q.
129, 130 (1980) ("Transactions [sic] costs arise principally when it is difficult to
determine the value of the goods or service"); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979)
(noting the growing reliance upon transaction costs).
85 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, in AN ECONOIC THEORIST'S BOOK OF TALES 7, 7-9 (1984) (using
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generally subject to so much informational ambiguity that they
can never be governed completely by markets."8 6
Prices are just numbers that are efficient only because they
contain so little information.87 In fact, prices represent "second
order" information, which has no meaning without communication
of contextual qualitative "first order" information.88 A cybernetic
framework can include all social relationships and institutions,
and thus provide a common foundation for linking together other
established theories such as transaction cost economics, resource-
based theories, and evolutionary theories.89
Established theories, such as those noted above, add richness
to the cybernetic framework. This, in turn, can also extend their
relevance to non-profit organizations, among other social
institutions. Most importantly, because cybernetics is grounded in
the laws of pure and applied science, it can provide a way of
developing a science of organization. 90 Cybernetics is capable of
doing this because unlike social constructs such as costs, value,
and money, which provide the basis for other theories, information
must have a physical manifestation. 91
II. PROBLEMS WITH UNITARY BOARDS
A. Excessive Powers
Lawyers and corporate watchdogs advise directors to avoid
conflicts between the interests of the company and those of the
directors. Conflicts of self-interest, however, cannot be avoided
the example of a used car purchase to demonstrate the function of information in a
market).
86 Ouchi, supra note 84, at 139.
87 See JAMES V. KOCH, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PRICES 311 (2d ed. 1980)
(noting that "ignorance of market characteristics such as price ... exist[s] in the real
world").
88 See W. Ross ASHBY, DESIGN FOR A BRAIN: THE ORIGIN OF ADAPTIVE
BEHAVIOUR (2d ed. 1960) thereinafter ASHBY, BEHAVIOUR] (Ashby is a noted pioneer in
the development of cybernetics).
89 See infra fig. 4 app. at 159 (setting forth the relationship of the cybernetic
framework to other theories of the firm).
90 Developing a science of organization has been sought by Oliver E. Williamson,
among others. See Williamson, supra note 16.
91 The cybernetic perspective meets the test of being a paradigm shift as it
"involves the same bundle of data as before, but places them in a new system of
relations with one another by giving them a different framework." KUHN, supra note 2,
at 85 (quoting HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN SCIENCE: 1300-1806,
at 1-7 (1949)).
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when corporate powers are concentrated in a single board, no
matter how diligent the director. In Figure 5, it is noted that the
powers which allow directors to appropriate value from
shareholders through their conflicts of self-interest are not those
required by the directors to add value for shareholders. 92 Thus,
separating these two powers, which are inherently at odds with
one another, would not jeopardize the ability of the directors to add
value.93 Instead, the division of powers in this way can protect
both investors and the reputations of directors while continuing to
benefit the company as a whole.
Directors of unitary boards possess the power to determine
their own remuneration, nomination, retirement, and the basis by
which their performance is assessed by shareholders because they
control how profits are determined and reported.94 Directors also
control and remunerate the auditor, who is supposed to represent
shareholders.95  In addition, directors control the conduct of
shareholder meetings and voting procedures, which allows them to
protect and maintain their power.
96
w See infra fig. 5 app. at 160.
93 See Lynne L. Dallas, Proposals for Reform of Corporate Boards of Directors: The
Dual Board and Board Ombudsperson, 54 WASIL & LEE L. REV. 91, 114 (1997)
(proposing a dual board consisting of a conflicts board, which would "consider conflicts
of interest issues and would be composed of independent directors," and a business
review board, which "would decide all other issues and would consist of a mix of
different kinds of directors").
94 One way that directors are able to mislead investors as to the value of a firm is
in the area of human resource costs. When firms report training costs immediately,
they show lower book values and earnings for the immediate period. When firms,
however, "report the benefits derived from their investments in-training without
declaring corresponding costs," they avoid such negative consequences-this accounting
practice, however, does not reflect economic reality. O'Connor, supra note 79, at 531.
95 See J. Guthrie & Shann Turnbull, Audit Committees: Is There a Role for
Corporate Senates and/or Stakeholder Councils?, CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L REV.,
Apr. 1995, at 78-79 [hereinafter Turnbull, Audit Committees]; Shann Turnbull, Flaws
and Remedies in Corporatisation and Privatisation, in HUMAN SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
1993, at 227-52 (1993) [hereinafter Turnbull, Flaws and Remedies]; Turnbull,
Structure and Ethics, supra note 19, at 1-4; Shann Turnbull, Positions Vacant, Wanted-
Corporate Whistle-Blowers, J. SEC. INST. AUSTL., Dec. 1992, at 2-6 [hereinafter
Turnbull, Vacant].
96 See infra fig. 5 app. at 160. Unitary boards have also been criticized because
combining the roles of the chairman and the CEO "represents a very substantial
concentration of power in the hands of one member of the board creating the potential
risk that they will exercise undue dominance over decision-making." Adding value in
the Boardroom-building on Cadbury's success (visited Feb. 15, 2000)
<httpv/www.icaew.co.uk/depts/td/hampel/cover.htn>.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Unitary boards concentrate power and create conflicts of
director self-interest, both of which frustrate the ability of
dispersed shareholders to participate in corporate self-regulation.
The result is popular demand for more laws, regulations, and
government oversight.97 This is a rational response to a long
standing issue. On the other hand, companies built upon
principles of self-regulation and self-governance are dependent
upon a division of power with checks and balances to retain
legitimacy, not new laws or increased government oversight.98
In addition to the corrupting influence absolute power has
over unitary boards with respect to managing their own conflicts of
self-interest, other problems are commonly associated with unitary
boards. These problems include a management hierarchy that
creates communication problems,99 and centralized decision-
making and control that creates information overload.100
B. Communication Problems
In any hierarchy, instructions have to be interpreted in order
to be made operational at lower levels. Information from lower
levels also needs to be condensed when reported back up the
hierarchy.1 1 Even simple communications can suffer quite serious
97 Even when there are procedures in place that limit the autonomy of corporate
boards, they have been largely unsuccessful. See Dallas, supra note 93, at 93 (stating
that many plans for reforming corporate boards are inadequate because they "fail to
deal adequately with social dynamics on boards" and because they "do not take proper
account of the many important relational roles of the board other than conflicts
monitoring"); see also Miller, supra note 75, at 52 (noting that shareholder derivative
actions based on mismanagement have become "extraordinarily difficult to win").
98 See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 1140 (explaining that the decentralized
market model used in the United States requires regulations that provide a system of
checks and balances). The "separation of the roles of the Chief Executive and Chairman
is often proposed as a method of ensuring an appropriate balance of power, increasing
accountability and increasing the capacity of the board for independent decision
making." OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (visited Nov. 11, 1999)
<http'//www.oecd.org/da:Vgovernance/principles.htm>.
99 See ALEXIS JACQUEMIN, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 142 (Fatemeh
Mehta trans., MIT 1987) (noting that "the U-form favors a pyramidal and bureaucratic
hierarchy in which feudalism and ritualism tend to predominate").
100 See id. (noting that with regard to U-form boards, "managers who are ...
responsible for [both] long-term strategic decisions and daily operational decisions] will
give more attention to the short run] because the pressures are more direct"); Oliver E.
Williamson, The Modern Corporation, in INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 70 (Anindya Sen
ed., 1996) (noting that managers operating within the U-form structure are unable to
"identify with or contribute to the realization of global goals" and instead attend "to
what they perceive[d] to be operational subgoals").
101 See ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 117 (1967) (discussing the
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misunderstandings, mistakes, and omissions when they are
relayed through as few as three or four people, even when all
individuals possess the very best of intentions.1 2 When people are
in a management hierarchy, however, it is usually not in their best
interest to report information to a superior that may reflect
adversely on his or her own performance. 10 3 This provides an
incentive for biases, distortions, and omissions in communications
in both public and private sector organizations. 10 4 Furthermore,
the need to interpret information sent down a chain of command
and condense information reported back up only increases the
problems of control and monitoring.
In a five-level hierarchy, it is assumed that the biases of
officials result in 10% of the true meaning of the information being
lost each time it is relayed through a level of management.10 5
Furthermore, it is assumed that 5% of the true meaning is lost
from errors in transmission,106 thus reducing correct information
by 15% per level. As a result, correct information represents only
85% of that which was condensed by 50% at each level.10 7 The
results of cumulative compounding in a five-level hierarchy, where
each level has a five-person span of control, are shown in the
"correct" and "missing" columns of Figure 6.108 Complicating
necessity of condensing information and the amount of information eliminated through
such processes); WILLIAMSON, MARKETS, supra note 14, at 134 (1975) (noting that
"[information flows rarely take the form of simple serial reproduction").
102 See DOWNS, supra note 101, at 117-18; see also DAVID G. BOWERS, SYSTEMS OF
ORGANIZATION: MANAGEMENT OF THE HUMAN RESOURCE 40-41 (1976) (discussing
factors that interfere with the comprehension of the message and its reception such as
"the identity and reputation of the sender," and whether the senders' past messages
were harsh or not).
103 See DOWNS, supra note 101, at 116-18; KENNETH D. GEORGE AND CAROLINE
JOLL, INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION: COMPETITION, GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE
103 (3d ed. 1981) (noting that the flow of information between the head office and shop
floor will be distorted by those seeking to protect their own positions); WLLIAMSON,
MARKETS, supra note 14, at 135 noting that "[dieliberate distortions will be introduced
into the hierarchial information exchange process in support of subgoals").
104 See DOWNS, supra note 101, at 116-18; see also infra fig. 6 app. at 161
(illustrating the loss of information in various hierarchies).
105 See DOWNS, supra note 101, at 118.
103 See id.
107 See id. at 117.
103 See infra fig. 6 app. at 161 (showing a sharp increase in the amount of
information either missing or received with an incorrect meaning as the information
moves from lower-level workers through middle and senior management, and
ultimately to CEO's and board directors); DOWNS, supra note 101, at 118 (calculating
that, if a corporation had to pass information through six levels, and each level resulted
in a distortion in meaning of 10% due to differing points of view and 5% due to errors in
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matters further is the possibility that a company's chief executive
officer (CEO) may not even have the information required to
control the corporation. 10 9
C. Information Overload
To avoid overloading senior management and directors of
unitary boards, information must be condensed, resulting in a loss
of information. 110 In the beginning of this century, large U.S. firms
addressed this issue by changing from unitary form to multi-
divisional form structures to avoid information overload."' As
noted earlier, the analysis of information problems in complex
enterprise operations can be applied when comparing unitary
boards with compound boards.112
As unitary form firms grew in size and complexity, the
quantity of information that had to be processed by top officers
became unmanageable. 113 The multi-divisional form reduces the
transmission, the information which emerged would only accurately reflect 38% of the
original information).
109 See WILLIAMSON, MARKETS, supra note 14, at 135 (discussing the possible loss
of control by the CEO when the firm expands and when the flow of information is not
smooth); see also infra fig. 6 app. at 161 (calculating that 96.7% of the information that
a CEO receives is either missing or has a wrong meaning). The resulting "[slerious
information problems limit the effectiveness of board members in the typical large
corporation." Jensen, supra note 12, at 864 (discussing the board's inability to properly
evaluate the performance of a CEO when the CEO controls the information given to the
board); GEORGE AND JOLL, supra note 103, at 102-03 (noting that communication
problems can "render the task of the chief executive impossible"). An alternative to
strict hierarchial methods of communicating information has been successfully
attempted by the Denmark-based company, Onitcon. See Polly Labarre, This
Organization is Dis-Organization (visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http://www.fastcompany.
com/online/03/oticon.html>. Emphasis on face-to-face communication between workers
and management contributed to a deeply troubled hearing aid manufacturer doubling
their revenue and increasing their operating profits ten times over a five-year period.
See id.
110 See WILLIAMSON, MARKETS, supra note 14, at 133-35 (discussing the summary
of data along the information chain and the resulting lack of ability to properly control
the firm).
111 See CHANDLER, supra note 51, at 2-3 (discussing the move by U.S. firms to a
"decentralized" form to better deal with diverse activities); Williamson, supra note 100,
at 71 (recognizing a rapid adoption by American firms of the multi-form structure from
1945-1960). Multi-form organizations "achieve greater internal efficiency" than unitary
form organizations "of similar size." GEORGE AND JOLL, supra note 103, at 103-04; see
also infra note 124 (discussing the influx of M-form firms in the United States).
112 See CHANDLER, supra note 51, at 2-3.
113 See id. (discussing the numerous decisions left to just a few top members of a
centralized firm); WILLIAMSON, MARKETS, supra note 14, at 134 (discussing the
inability of managers to handle the "demands placed upon it").
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volume of information processed by top management by filtering
out the higher frequency (i.e. short-run) information. Such
information is made the responsibility of the lower operating
divisions. 114  Top management is then able to limit their
information processing to lower frequency (i.e. long-run) strategic
decision information. 115
The advantage of the multi-divisional form can be explained in
terms of the division of decision-making labor.116 The cybernetic
significance of technical and temporal specialization of
organizational information is reflected by the theory that the
survival of any organism under natural selection is dependent
upon developing two readily distinguishable feedbacks. 117
Cybernetic analysis demonstrates that double feedback is an
essential feature for the self-regulation of any living thing,
machine, device, or organization."18
A division of decision-making labor in multi-divisional form
firms becomes possible because such a form allows organizations to
be decomposed "into relatively independent subsystems, each one
114 See CHANDLER, supra note 51, at 11 (discussing the division of decision-making
power between executives and departments); WHLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 50
(discussing the allocation of higher frequency dynamics to lower levels of the
organization). Because of the large degree of autonomy that each operational division is
granted in a multi-divisional firm, each division resembles a quasi-firm managed to
achieve a specific objective. See JACQUEMIN, supra note 99, at 143.
115 See CHANDLER, supra note 51, at 11; see also WILLIAISON, CAPITALISM, supra
note 50, at 283 (discussing the allocation of lower frequency dynamics to higher levels
of the organization).
116 See WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 50, at 282 (explaining that division
of decision-making allows independent subsystems to concentrate on a specific aspect of
the organization with minimal concern for the other aspects of the organization); see
also Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1943-44 (1996) (discussing the benefit of the allocation of
decision-making power between the board, managers, and shareholders); Herbert A.
Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 106 AM. PHIL. SOC'Y 467, 467-82 (1962).
117 See ASHBY, BEHAVIOUR, supra note 88, at 130-31 (discussing the adaptation of
organisms to bi-modal disturbances described as either "frequent" or "occasional");
WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 50, at 282 (discussing Ashby's theory of double
feedback in terms of the division of labor).
118 See ASHBY, BEHAVIOUR, supra note 88, at 131 (discussing stabilization and
subsequent survival of organisms through double feedback); WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM,
supra note 50, at 282 (stating that Ashby's theory "established that all adaptive
systems that have a capacity to respond to a bimodal distribution of disturbances-some
being disturbances in degree: other[s] being disturbances in kind-will be characterized
by double feedback"). See generally STAFFORD BEER, THE HEART OF ENTERPRISE 62-63
(1979) [hereinafter BEER, ENTERPRISE] (discussing feedback and its role in self-
regulation).
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of which can be designed with only minimal concern for its
interaction with the others."" 9 Decomposition can create what is
now recognized as holonic architecture, which evolves in nature to
create and manage complexity.120 It has been observed that "the
problem of organization is precisely one of decomposing the
enterprise in efficient information processing respects." 2 1 It has
been further noted that "[Mimitation of the [multi-]form innovation
was at first rather slow,"1 22 and "prior to 1968, most large
European companies administered their domestic operations
through U-form oT holding company internal structures."123 There
was, however, less need for large European firms to adopt the
multi-divisional form architecture because their operating and
strategic decisions were already separated.124 This decomposition
of decision-making was an inherent feature in large European
firms because they possessed compound boards with two or more
control centers. 125
Many scholars have analyzed the failure of unitary boards to
control or even sustain the economic viability of a business.126 U.S.
119 WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 50, at 282-83 (citation omitted); see also
JACOB MARSCHAK & ROY RADNER, ECONOMIC THEORY OF TEAMS 187 (1972)
(discussing decentralization of groups and the lack of communication between the sub-
groups); BOWERS, supra note 102, at 52-59 (discussing decentralization of groups and
lack of communication between sub-groups).
120 See John Mathews, Holonic Organisational Architecture, in HUMAN SYSTEMS
MANAGEMENT 15, 27-54 (1996) (on file with author); see also Sandra Harding, John
Mathews, Catching the Wave: Workplace Reform in Australia, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 589,
590 (1996) (book review) (describing Mathews's holonic architecture as the
development of intelligent organizations or networks of organizations that are
"cellular" or "modular" and which "bring together tools, logistics, and people in a
flexible, integrated whole").
121 WILIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 50, at 283 (citations omitted). Multi-
divisional firms efficiently process information through decomposition and thus make
provisions to deal with the opportunism that is not taken into account by the team
theory. See id.; see also BOWERS, supra note 102, at 52-59 (discussing the importance of
communication between groups in an organization).
122 WILLIAMSON, MARKETS, supra note 14, at 140.
123 Id. at 141 (citation omitted).
124 "The M-form revolution, which began in the U.S. in the 1920's, involved a
steady metamorphosis of the differentiated, multi-division organization out of the
nondivisionalized (U-form) organization in large firms." Barry D. Baysinger & Henry
N. Butler, Antitakeover Amendments, Managerial Entrenchment, and the Contractual
Theory of the Corporation, 71 VA. L. REV. 1257, 1273 n.69 (1985) (citation omitted).
Also, in an M-form firm, long-run entrepreneurial activities are handle by a different
office and staff than handle day-to-day activities. See id. (citation omitted); see also
infra fig. 10 app. at 165.
125 See supra note 124.
126 See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, MARKETS, supra note 14, at 134-35; Richard M.
[74:89
20001 CHARTERS WITH COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES 11
scholars, however, have not explained these failures because most
have neglected to compare the conflicts of self-interest and power
relationships in unitary boards with those in compound boards
found in non-Anglophile countries. One problem is the lack of
interest in compound boards and a lack of methodology,127 which is
considered below. An exception to this apathy is Lynne L. Dallas,
who bases her arguments for "a dual board" on an interdisciplinary
approach using accepted theories of the firm, empirical studies,
law, and psychology.12
D. The Problems of Self-Regulation and Self-Governance in
Hierarchies
The words "control," "regulate," and "govern," as used in
Figure 7129 have been defined with the related concepts of "self-
control," "self-regulation," and "self-governance." 130 As Figure 7
illustrates, neither self-regulation nor self-governance can be
achieved without effective regulation or governance. 131 It has been
said that power corrupts, and "absolute power corrupts
absolutely." 32  The solution to such potential corruption, with
respect to the context addressed herein, is to divide power in order
to create a system of checks and balances. 133 An analysis of the
problem is based on political structures in which the controllers
may be seeking advantages of power, status, and influence, rather
Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative Perspective,
57 BROOK. L REV. 1, 44 (1991).
127 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Rights and Production
Functions: An Application to Labor-managed Firms and Codetermination, 52 J. BUS.
469, 503 (1979) (explaining the lack of effort in evaluating codetermined firms).
w2 Dallas, supra note 93, at 97.
129 See Fig. 7 app. at 162.
130 Turnbull, Corporate Governance, supra note 3, at 81.
131 See generally Yevgeniy V. Nikulin, The New Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate
Law: Myth or Reality, 6 DET. C.L. J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 347 (1997) (discussing the
functioning of self-governance and self-enforcement through a regulatory structure
developed by Black & Kraakman); see also infra fig. 7 app. at 162 (reflecting the
possibility of self-governance and self-regulation).
132 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS (3d ed. 1979) (quoting Lord Action in a
letter to Bishop Creighton, April 3, 1887).
133 See WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM supra note 50, at 299 (noting that, in large
corporations, those in control will operate the organization for the benefit of their own
interests rather than those of the owners); T. Persson et al., Separation of Powers and
Accountability: Towards a Formal Approach to Comparative Politics (July 1996)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic
Research).
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than just economic benefits.134 By introducing an appropriate
division of powers, the welfare of stakeholders can be increased as
compared to the welfare of stockholders under unitary control.1 35
Identifying an "appropriate" division of power for corporate
charters is critical because, without one, it is not possible for
corporations to provide "independent processes." 136 Further, the
information and control channels required to achieve self-
regulation and self-governance also provide the ability to improve
competitive advantages.
E. Gaps in Corporate Governance Scholarship
Compound boards have been neglected by U.S. scholars in the
field because they admittedly "do not have a theory that ... tell[s]
us how supervisory boards.., behave...."137 Another reason why
U.S. scholars have neglected the study of alternative systems of
governance is that "the American system seem[s] to represent the
evolutionary pinnacle of corporate governance, so other systems
[are] either less far along the Darwinist path, or evolutionary
deadends; neither lagards nor neanderthals ma[kle interesting
objects of study."38 As noted earlier, the lack of scholarship on
compound boards is also explained by both the lack of an accepted
theoretical framework for comparing systems of corporate
governance within or between cultures, and the problem of
developing a viable theory of organizations. Another problem is
that cultural specificities exist with respect to theories and practice
of corporate governance. 39 The cybernetic perspective, however,
offers a way to fill the research gap and overcome the cultural
134 See Persson et al., supra note 133; see also John Pound, The Rise of the Political
Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1027-
32 (1993) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the political model of
corporations).
135 See WHInAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 50, at 283-84 (discussing how the
multi-division form makes provisions for opportunism of managers through a division
of power); Pound, supra note 134, at 1029 (stating that the mere existence of the
shareholders' power to vote out the board allows them to control and monitor the board
in a wide variety of ways).
136 See infra fig. 7 app. at 162 (showing the requirements show the necessary
checks that must be exercised by stakeholders in order to participate in governance).
137 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 127, at 503.
138 Ronald J. Gilson, Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency, in ASPECTS
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 131, 132 (M. Isaksson & R. Skog eds., 1994) (on file with
author).
139 See supra notes 20-21, 124 and accompanying text (discussing various
organizational approaches throughout the world).
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specificities in existing theories based on culturally-specific social
constructs. Examples have been given of a cybernetic approach to
corporate governance,- 4° including a suggestion of design criteria
for social institutions. 41
III. CYBERNETIC ANALYSIS OF COMPOUND BOARDS
A. Requisite Variety in Control
A fundamental law of cybernetics is that "control can be
obtained only if the variety of the controller (and in this case of all
the parts of the controller) is at least as great as the variety of the
situation to be controlled."142 William Ross Ashby's Law of
Requisite Variety ("Ashby's Law") states that the variety of a
regulator must equal that of the disturbances whose effect it is to
negate 43  Unfortunately, Ashby's Law remains poorly
understood.14 To overcome this problem, a number of examples
have been developed to communicate its meaning,145 including a
football team metaphor used to explain the law.146 In order to
have the chance to control the players of an opposing team and
compete effectively, the same number of players are required on
each team.147 Teams that do not have sufficient players, i.e.
140 See generally SHANN TURNBULL, DEP'T OF ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT OF ABORIGINAL COMMUNITIES IN THE NORTHERN TERRITORY: A STUDY
IN TWO PARTS (1980); see also Shann Turnbull, Stakeholder Governance: A Cybernetic
and Property Rights Analyses, CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L REV., Jan. 1997, at 11-23
[hereinafter Turnbull, Stakeholder Governance]. Full text at <http'//cog.kent.edu/lib/
turnbull6/turnbull6.html>. Shann Turnbull, Stakeholder Cooperation, 29 J.
COOPERATIVE STUD. 18 (1997). Full text at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper.taf.
ABSTRACT_ID=26238>; Shann Turnbull, Stakeholder Democracy: Redesigning the
Governance of Firms and Bureaucracies, 23 J. SOC. ECON. 321, 328 (1994); Shann
Turnbull, The Application of Cybernetic Knowledge in Governing Society, Address
Before the International Conference on Knowledge, Economy and Society, University of
Montreal (July 3, 1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (offering
suggested design criteria for social institutions).
141 See supra note 140.
142 STAFFORD BEER, BRAIN OF THE FIRM 41 (2d ed. 1981).
143 See ASHBY, CYBERNETICS supra note 15, at 206-07.
144 See BEER, ENTERPRISE, supra note 118, at 84 (comparing the
misunderstandings of Ashby's theory to Newton's theory of gravity and Einstein's
theory of relativity).
145 See id. at 84-96 (providing various examples of the workings of the Law of
Requisite Variety).
146 See STAFFORD BEER, DECISION AND CONTROL: THE MEANING OF OPERATIONAL
RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT CYBERNETICS (1994).
147 See id.
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requisite variety, become uncompetitive. 148 Similarly, without
sufficient members, firms are unable to compete. 149
With respect to corporations, Ashby's Law means that if the
competitive standing of a company is affected by performance-type
variables in its environment, then, at the least, corporate
controllers need performance-type responses to remain
competitive. 150 If the conformance requirements of the board
require that conformance-type activities be regulated, then
directors need at least conformance-type control mechanisms. 151
For directors to effectively carry out either their performance or
conformance roles, they need requisite variety in their control
system to manage all performance and conformance variables. 152
Consequently, parts of a control system designed to manage
performance variables will also manage some conformance
variables and vice versa.153 As a result, the control systems
needed to improve competitiveness and self-regulation support
each other,154 leading Ashby to state that "only variety can destroy
[and thereby control] variety."155 Another formulation of the law is
that complexity is required to manage complexity.15 6 Non-trivial
firms with unitary boards do not meet the test of possessing
requisite variety, and so their competitive capabilities cannot
match those with an appropriately designed compound boards. 5 7
B. Requisite Variety in Information
A related cybernetic theorem established by Claude E.
Shannon in 1949 posits that accurate information can be obtained
even when noise, distortion, and bias exist in a communication
148 See id.
149 See id.
150 See BEER, ENTERPRISE, supra note 118, at 96 (discussing the need to raise
performance levels to deal with more variety).
161 See id.
152 See id. at 96-99.
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 ASHBY, CYBERNETICS, supra note 15, at 207; see also BEER, supra note 142, at
41 (applying Ashby's law of requisite variety).
156 See BEER, ENTERPRISE, supra note 118, at 32. As business systems become
more complex, managers must employ complex responses to deal with the increasing
variety of possibilities that may occur. See id. The goal is to maintain balance, which
managers accomplish by countering variety with practices aimed at destroying it. See
id. at 39.
157 See infra notes 159 and 170-71 and accompanying text.
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channel by establishing variety in information channels.158
Establishing variety in information channels is necessary because
"if... management were compelled to rely on the information it
acquired through 'orthodox! channels of communications, it would
certainly never have anything like requisite variety for controlling
the company for the simple reason that the orthodox channels
could not transmit it."'59
It has been noted that
before Shannon's work it was thought that any channel, with a
little more skill, could be modified to carry a little more
information. He showed that the engineer's duty is to get
reasonably near the maximum, for beyond it no-one can go.
The law of Requisite Variety enforces a similar strategy on the
would-be regulator and controller: he should try to get near his
maximum-beyond that he cannot go.160
Limitations in communicating complex information, however,
can be overcome to a certain extent by amplification.161
C. Amplification of Regulation to Change the Role of
Government
Vice President Al Gore has suggested that amplification
strategy be used to change the role of government. In a speech to
scientists, he identified the role of governmental policy as being
158 See Claude E. Shannon, Communications Theory of Secrecy Systems, 28 BELL
SYS. TECHNICAL J. 656 (1949).
159 STAFFORD BEER, DECISION AND CONTROL: THE MEANING OF OPERATIONAL
RESEARCH AND MANAGEM IENT CYBERNETICS 282 (1994); see also Donald C. Langevoort,
The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and
Organizational Behavior, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 639-40 (1997) (explaining the
phenomenon of cognitive simplification). Humans must simplify their thought
provisions in order to deal with the multitude of daily issues. Consequently, individuals
develop stock explanations that are equally applicable to a wide-range of situations.
Thus, managers are deprived of individually relevant facts. See id.
160 ASHBY, CYBERNETICS, supra note 15, at 245.
161 See id. at 265. Amplifiers work "by having available a generous reservoir of
what is to be emitted, and then using the input to act as controller to the flow from the
reservoir." Id. It is by this process that information can be communicated simply in the
seeds of plants and embryos of animals to provide instructions for nature to build
complex, self-regulating living things. Furthermore, it has application to police services.
See BEER, ENTERPRISE, supra note 118, at 90. Assume, for example, that if there is one
police officer for every 500 citizens, then the officer must increase his information base
500-fold. To accomplish this, a variety of informational devices are implemented,
including fingerprint technology. Fingerprinting creates a generous reservoir of
information. Accordingly, the officer can use a single set of fingerprints to isolate a
specific record in the database. See id.
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akin to "imprinting the DNA" of social institutions. 62 Ashby also
observed that "the gene-pattern must act as determinant to the
living organism's mechanism for adaptation."163 Thus, it seems
that genetic structures communicate information on how an
organism is designed to regulate itself much in the same way as
corporate charters and by-laws dictate how corporations govern
themselves.
The Gore strategy would not involve establishing government
regulations on how commercial enterprises should operate or
behave. 164 Instead, government would act indirectly by specifying
basic design criteria for corporate charters. Assuming this
strategy would be successful in introducing self-regulation, it
would allow simplification of corporate law through reducing the
need for governments and regulatory agencies to adopt
prescriptive laws and regulations. 165
The most effective, complete, and efficient regulation can be
achieved by building as much self-regulation as possible into the
162 Gore, supra note 15 (urging the United States to "update [its] notions of self-
government and bring them into harmony with the information age").
163 ASHBY, CYBERNETICS, supra note 15, at 134-37.
164 See Gore, supra note 15 (proposing that regulations be based on science and not
suspicion). Not only would Gore's strategy not involve new regulations, but it would not
even involve the adoption of any new procedures or processes as advocated by Sir
Adrian Cadbury, J.P. Hawley and A.T. Williams. See id.; see also The Report of the
Cadbury Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance: The Code of Best
Practice, in INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: TEXT, READINGS AND CASES
576 (Robert I. Tricker ed., 1994) (advocating a voluntary "code of best practice"); A.T.
Williams, Corporate Governance in the United States: The Rise of Fiduciary
Capitalism (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Richard Wachman,
Code According to Cadbury: A Lashing from Labour, EVENING STANDARD (London),
May 27, 1992, at 32 (suggesting that adoption of a voluntary cede of best practice might
result in avoidance or earlier detection of a number of company failures and instances
of management fraud); Soft-Centered, ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1992, at 78 (arguing that it
is for the stockholders to apply pressure on the company to adopt a code of best
practice, although legislation may be necessary if companies do not respond); Paul
Durman, Cadbury Presents 19-Point Code for Company Practice, INDEPENDENT
(London), May 28, 1992, at 24 (reporting that the voluntary code, which is based on
principles of openness, integrity, and accountability, has been warmly received as an
effort to improve corporate governance); Erik Ipsen, Outside Directors Seen as Fraud
Cure in U.K, INVL HERALD TRIB. (France), Dec. 2, 1992 (arguing that it is necessary to
maintain a balance of power where no one individual has total discretion).
165 See generally Geoffrey Miller, Political Structure and Corporate Governance:
Some Points of Contrast Between the United States and England, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L,
R. 51 (1998) (comparing the various methods used as a form of corporate governance).
One of the chief tools used in the United States is the derivative lawsuit brought by
shareholders. See id. Its effect, however, of curbing abuse by managers is questionable
and it is expensive to bring. See id.
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basic units of society and, in particular, business enterprises. 166
"Imprinting the DNA"167 of firms has been carried out in the 150
stakeholder-controlled cooperatives established around the town of
Mondrag6n in Spain during the last forty years.168 Funding to
establish these firms was provided by a bank created and owned
by the cooperatives on the condition that the firms adopt charters
that divided power into five centers. 169 Figure 9 illustrates how
such "inprinting" distributes the functions of a unitary board into
a compound board with five independently constituted centers. 70
D. Case Study of Amplification and Requisite Variety
Unlike the sub-committees found in a unitary board, the
control centers of a Mondrag6n compound board are appointed by
different constituencies in order to create a division of power as
well as increase function.' 7 ' In this way, power differentials are
substantially reduced to permit self-regulation without relying on
the idiosyncratic behavior of individuals to act as self-less stewards
rather than as self-interested agents. 7 2
A division of power creates a very persuasive basis for "trust
based coordination mechanisms."1 S Scholars have long identified
the operating advantages of establishing trust with employees and
166 See Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors
in American Corporations, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 317, 326 (1998) (illustrating the
effectiveness of corporate governance provisions). All corporations generate agency
costs. See id. Initiatives to reduce such costs are also a cost, thus, effectiveness can be
judged by the net reduction in cost. See id
167 Gore, supra note 15.
'cs See Shann Turnbull, Innovations in Corporate Governance: The Mondragdn
Experience, 3 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INTL REV. 167, 167-80 (1995) [hereinafter
Turnbull, Innovations].
169 See infra tbls.9, 12 app. at A-9, A-12; see also A. Campbell et al., Worker-
Owners: The Mondragdn Achievement, in ANGLO-GERMAN FOUNDATION FOR THE
STUDY OF SOCIETY (1977) (detailing the charters employed by these firms); CAJA
LABORAL POPULAR, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT (1992); MCC, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT (1992);
T. MOLLNER, THE PROPHET OF THE PYRENNEs: THE SEARCH FOR THE RELATIONSHIP
AGE (1991); ROY MORRISON ET AL., MAKING MONDRAGON: THE GROWTH AND
DYNAMICS OF THE WORKER COOPERATIVE COMPLEX (1998).
170 See infrafig. 9 app. at 164; The Report of the Cadbury Committee on the
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance: The Code of Best Practice, supra note 164,
at 577.
171 See HENK THOMAS & CHRIS LOGAN, MONDRAGON: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
182-88 (1982) [hereinafter THOMAS & LOGAN].
172 See id. (discussing the criteria of self-management).
173 Charles F. Sabel, Constitutional Orders: Trust Building and Response to
Change, in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS 155 (J.
Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert Boyer eds., 1997).
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other stakeholders. 174 When information and power is shared with
customers and suppliers, as occurs in a Keiretsu and Mondrag6n
firm, different boundaries of the firm can be established to provide
strategic advantages.17 5
In a Mondrag6n industrial firm, its general assembly of
members elect the Watchdog Council and members of the
Supervisory Board. 7 6 The Supervisory Board appoints the CEO
and department heads who then serve as members of the
Management Council.177  Work groups, which meet weekly,
appoint a delegate to the Social Council.178 Individual firms are
associated with Relationship Associations, or simply Groups,
which act like a meta firm with its own division of powers. 179 The
twelve groups combine to create the Mondrag6n Corporaci6n
Cooperativa (MCC) with its own information and control feedback
loops. The MCC involves its own constituencies of individuals and
support firms180 and has the effect of creating a "holarchy."181
The Mondrag6n Holarchy has three levels of "concatated
holons" to illustrate the three levels of learning. 82 Furthermore, it
has lateral recursive support holons. 83 Evidence that this is the
most robust way to create or manage complexity is provided by
evolution developing holonic architecture in all living things,184
and the mathematical analysis provided by Herbert A. Simon.185
When first exposed to the complexity of the Mondrag6n
174 See S. HELPER ET AL, THE BOUNDARIES OF THE FIRM AS A DESIGN PROBLEM
(1997) (unpublished working paper, on file with author); J.M. PODOLNY & KJ. PAGE,
NETWORK FORMS OF ORGANIZATION (1997) (working paper, on file with author); M.
Van Alstyne, The State of Network Organization" A Survey in Three Frameworks, 7 J.
ORG. COMPUTING 3 (1997).
175 See generally Sabel, supra note 173.
176 See THOMAS & LOGAN, supra note 171, at 29 (noting that members of the
Watchdog Council serve four-year terms while members of the Supervisory Board serve
one-year terms).
177 See id. (noting that Management Council members serve four-year terms).
178 See Turnbull, Innovations, supra note 168 (noting that Social Council members
serve three-year terms).
179 See infra fig. 11 app. at 166-67.
180 See infra fig. 9 app. at 164.
181 See infra fig. 8 app. at 163; see also ARTHUR KOESrLER, THE GHOST IN THE
MACHINE 208-09 (1967).
182 J. Mathews, Holonic Organisational Architectures, 15 HUM. SYS. MGMT. 27-54
(1996) [hereinafter Holonic].
183 See Turnbull, Innovations, supra note 168; see also infra fig. 7 app. at 162.
184 See J.C. SMUTS, HOLISM AND EVOLUTION 160-61 (1926).
185 See generally Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 106 PROC. AM
PHIL. SO'Y 467 (1962).
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cooperative, many scholars and business people believed it would
be extremely difficult to manage and would result in competitive
disadvantages. Empirical evidence 86 and cybernetic analysis, 8 7
however, show that this is not the case.
Business executives are also concerned that the Mondrag6n
cooperative's multiple centers of control would result in managers
attending endless meetings. This assumption, however, is based
upon their experiences in a command and control hierarchy that
makes managers responsible and accountable for all subordinate
activities. One may posit that managers across the spectrum of
corporate forms establish joint ventures, alliances, and other forms
of network relationships so as to focus on core competencies
without distractions from activities carried out by subordinate
entities. Similar advantages of specialization arise within the
construct of a compound board.1 8 As such, endless meetings do
not occur because managers are not responsible for the activities of
all subordinates.
The sharing of power in a Mondrag6n firm also introduces the
sharing of responsibility and accountability. This, in turn,
introduces self-management at all levels and reduces the work
load at higher levels, much like the way multidivisional-form firms
provide advantages over unitary-form firms. 8 9 For example, the
evaluation and remuneration of workers is not the responsibility of
line managers-this is self-managed by work groups and the
Social Council. 90
Self-regulation of the MCC system is woven into its
constituent firms. Ashby stated:
[Tihe provision of a small regulator at the first stage may lead
to the final establishment of a much bigger regulator (i.e. one of
larger capacity) so that the process shows amplification.
This is the sense in which "amplifying" regulation is to be
understood. The law of Requisite Variety, like the law of
Conservation of Energy, absolutely prohibits any direct and
18s See discussion infra Part IV.
187 See Turnbull, Innovations, supra note 168; see also ASHBY, CYBERNETICS,
supra note 15, at 4-6 (discussing the uses of cybernetics and complex systems);
Heylighen, supra note 1.
18s See infra fig. 9 app. at 164; INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: TEXT,
READINGS AND CASES, supra note 164, at 245,287.
189 See WILLIAMSON, CAPITALISM, supra note 50, at 281-83; see also THOMAS &
LOGAN, supra note 171, at 66-68 (discussing various aspects of labor and work load).
190 See Turnbull, Innovations, supra note 168, at 167-80.
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simple magnification but it does not prohibit
supplementation. 191
This observation is diametrically opposed to the way in which
governments seek to regulate firms, organizations, and activities
in society generally. One of the reasons for the failure of
"corporate internal control mechanisms" 192  is excessive
regulation.193 To counter these problems, the "SEC has sought to
strengthen 'broadbased participation in corporate governance.' "194
This is consistent with the recommendations of other scholars who
agree there is a need to involve customers, employees, and
suppliers in the governance of large U.S. corporations. 195
Figures 11 and 12 provide examples of customers, employees, and
suppliers participating in the control of firms in the Mondrag6n
and Japanese Keiretsu systems. 196
E. Simplifying the Role of Directors
The involvement of a greater number of individuals in the
processes of decision-making and control reduces the work load on
individuals. The degree to which this is achieved in Mondrag6n is
illustrated at the bottom of Figure 9.197 This indicates that the
total number of members in a Mondrag6n compound board could
be around forty, compared with around ten sitting on a unitary
191 ASHBY, CYBERNETICS, supra note 15, at 268.
192 Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of
Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 833 (1993).
193 See Amar Bhide, Efficient Markets, Deficient Governance, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 129 (noting that the "system nurtures market liquidity at the
expense of good governance" and that such system "foster[s] antagonistic, arm's-length
relationships between shareholders and managers.").
194 Id. at 137-38 (quoting former SEC chairman Richard Breeden).
195 See, e.g., MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 322 (1995) (referring to
the interests of critical stakeholders); M1TSUHIRO FUKAO, FINANCIAL INTEGRATION,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AND THE PERFORMANCE OF MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES 74,
77-78 (1995) (discussing harmonization of various business rules as part of a solution);
M.E. Porter, Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industry,
Research Report Presented to the Council on Competitiveness and the Harvard
Business School (1997) (on file with author); Shann Turnbull, Corporate Governance,
HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1995, at 169 (considering "most directors com[ing] from
outside the company" to be "a defect in the U.S. system of corporate governance")
(internal quotations omitted).
196 See infra tbls.11, 12 app. at A-11, A-12. It is important to note that independent
directors are not present in Mondrag6n firms, and few are found in the Japanese
Keiretsu.
197 See infra fig. 9 app. at 164.
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Anglo board.198 This not only allows greater participation in
decision-making, but also specialization in the knowledge and
processes of decision-making. It is by this means that ordinary
people can achieve extraordinary results.199 In addition:
Various indicators have been used to explore the economic
efficiency of the Mondrag[61n group of cooperatives. During
more than two decades[,] a considerable number of cooperative
factories have functioned at a level equal or superior in
efficiency to that of capitalist enterprises. The compatibility
question in this case has been solved without doubt. Efficiency
in terms of the use made of scarce resources has been higher in
the cooperatives; their growth record of sales, exports[,] and
employment, under both favorable and adverse economic
conditions, has been superior to that of capitalist enterprises.200
The international competitiveness of both Mondrag6n and
Japanese firms does not rely on independent directors that are
promoted by the U.S. Council of Institutional Investors, 201 the
Cadbury Committee,20 2 and the Australian Investment Managers
Association.203 Indeed, the Mondrag6n and Japanese firms provide
evidence of the value of involving related parties with inside expert
knowledge and authority with a long-term interest and
commitment to a firm.20 4 It is the existence of a compound board
that allows the related party interests to be used constructively.205
A commercial enterprise cannot exist without customers,
employees, and suppliers. Such groups, because of their critical
role in the very existence of a firm, have been described as
strategic stakeholders.206  When strategic stakeholders have
198 See id.; INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: TEXT, READINGS AND
CASES, supra note 164, at 245, 287.
199 See THOMAS & LOGAN, supra note 171, at 109. (noting that the "cooperatives
are more efficient than many private enterprises," and that while there have been
occasional fluctuations, on the whole, "there can be no doubt that the cooperatives have
been more profitable than capitalist enterprises").
200 Id. at 126-27.
201 See Council of Institutional Investors, Explanatory Notes (visited Nov. 12, 1999)
<http'/www.ciicentral.com/ciicentral/notes.htm> (defining an "independent director" as
"a person whose directorship constitutes his or her only connection to the corporation").
202 See The Report of the Cadbury Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate
Governance: The Code of Best Practice, supra note 164, at 576.
203 See AUSTRALIAN INVESTMENT MANAGERS' ASSOCIATION, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW (1995).
204 See Turnbull, Innovations, supra note 168, at 167-80.
205 See generally THOMAS & LOGAN, supra note 171.
206 See Shann Turnbull, Stakeholder Cooperation, 29 J. COOPERATIVE STUD. 18,
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informed and expert information, they can provide management
with a strong opposition perspective.207  Stakeholders can
introduce the prospect of "insurgency" and "contestability" to
management in order to establish competition for control through
the boardroom rather than through the much more expensive,
slower, and problematic competition for control that can occur
through the stock market.208 This raises a fundamental question
of whether the most competitive form of corporate governance
requires a company to be publicly-traded. It may well turn out,
however, that privately held entities provide the most efficacious
form of enterprise. In fact, the two-tiered compound boards
created by privately-held leveraged buy out associations and
privately-owned Mondrag6n firms represent proven models of
corporate governance structure with outstanding records.209
The point has been made that, "[i]nformation, particularly
proprietary and technically complex information, could flow better
from inside the company to a holder of a nonsaleable, illiquid block
of stock than to scattered traders on the stock market."2 10 Thus,
corporate governance reform may lead unlisted firms, in either the
private or public sector, to become more competitive than publicly-
traded corporations. This suggests that when government-owned
enterprises are slated to be privatized, corporate governance
reform of their boards should be carried out beforehand.211 There
18-52 (1997). Full text at <httpi//papers.ssrn.comsol3/paper.tafABSTRACTID=262
38>; Shann Turnbull, Stakeholder Governance: A Cybernetic and Property Rights
Analysis, CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L REV., Jan. 1997, at 11-23. Full text at
<http://cog.kent.edu/lib/turnbull6/turnbul6.html>.
207 See John Pound, Creating Relationship Institutional Investors and
Corporations: A Proposal to Restore Balance in the American Corporate Governance
Process, Address Before the Columbia University Law School's Center for Law and
Economic Studies at the Conference on Relationship Investing: Possibilities, Patterns
and Problems (May 6-7, 1993) [hereinafter Pound, Address] (on file with author).
208 Id.
209 See Jensen, supra note 191, at 869. For an analysis of the comparative
advantages of networks with hierarchies, see M. Van Alstyne, The State of Network
Organization: A Survey in Three Frameworks, 7 J. ORG. COMPUTING 3 (1997) and Joel
M. Podolny & Karen L. Page, Network Forms of Organization (1998) (visited Feb. 15,
2000) <http://papers.ssrn.com> (working paper, Stanford University, Graduate School
of Business).
210 Mark Roe, Comparative Corporate Governance, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICs AND THE LAw 339, 340 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
211 See SHANN TURNBULL & J. GUTRIE, PUBLIC INTEREST WHISTLE-BLOWERS
909-1003 (1994) (discussing material originally presented as oral testimony before the
Australian Senate Select Committee on Public Sector Whistle Blowing, March 7, 1994)
[hereinafter PUBLIC INTEREST]; see also Turnbull, Audit Committees, supra note 95, at
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are also theoretical grounds to support the possibility that
privately-held firms could be made superior to publicly-traded
firms. It has been established that firms exist because the market
fails to mzeinimi the costs of governing transactions.21 2 The
advantage of using markets rather than organizations to govern
transactions is reduced, however, as the structure of organizations
are improved to increase their economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness. 213  It has been suggested "that markets exists
because organizations have failed to utilize holonic structures," i.e.,
to utilize the most robust and economic method of communicating
complex information in the simple ways found in Mondrag6n, and
even in DNA and throughout the universe.214
IV. CORPORATE CHARTERS WITH COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES
After a fifteen year study of boards, certain scholars have
concluded that "[alt this point in history, existing mechanisms for
governing corporations are no longer adequate. The scale,
complexity, importance, and risks of corporate activity have
overrun our institutions."215 As such, "[tlhe need for rethinking
the system design parameters of modern corporations is apparent,"
more today than ever before.216 Further, it has been argued that
there is a need for a "shareholder panel"217 to supervise directors in
a manner consistent with the role of the "corporate senate"
advocated by this author and other scholars.218
In discussing the prevalence of shareholder panels and
committees, it has been noted that, "[ciurrently, there is a
resurgence of this activity," and that such committees "can act like
78-79; Shann Turnbull, Best Practice in the Governance of GBEs' in THE AUSTRALIAN
PUBLIC SECTOR: PATHWAYS TO CHANGE IN THE 1990S, 99-109 (J. Guthrie ed., 1995)
[hereinafter PATHWAYS].
212 See Coase, supra note 26, at 21.
213 See Turnbull, Self-Regulation, supra note 8.
214 See Turnbull, Corporate Governance, supra note 3, at 180-205.
215 DEMB & NEUBAUER, supra note 9, at 1.
216 See The corporate concept: Redesigning a successful system, HUMAN
SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT 9,65-76,1990.
217 D.J. Hatherly, The Case for the Shareholder Panel in the U.K, EuR. ACCT.
REV., 4:3, 1994, at 535-53.
218 Turnbul, Vacant, supra note 95 at 3; see also ROBERT AG. MONKS & NELL
MINOW, WATCHING THE WATCHERS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
317 (1996); N.E. RENTON, COMPANY DIRECTORS: MASTERS OR SERVANTS (1994);
ROBERT L TRICKER, POCKET DIRECTOR (2d ed. 1998); Turnbull, Audit Committees,
supra note 95; Turnbull, Diploma Course, supra note 5; Turnbull, Flaws and Remedies,
supra note 95, at 227-52.
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a shadow cabinet in a parliamentary system, offering shareholders
independent analysis and an alternative agenda."219 The win-win
results associated with creating loyal opposition to management
have been well documented.220 Furthermore, it has been stated
that "the non-executive board of directors is, by its design, an
ineffective control device" and that "the whole rationale for having
a board becomes suspect."221 In addition, "one of Canada's best-
known business leaders suggested . . . that boards of directors
should be abolished and replaced by a formal committee of
advisers."222
From the issues considered herein, it must be concluded that
adherence to unitary boards by federal and state governments,
regulators, stock exchanges, institutional investors, and
professional associations is perpetuating a corrupt, inefficient, and
non-competitive system of corporate governance. It is time to use
common sense and blow the whistle on what seems to be a
conspiracy of denial regarding the fundamental weakness of
unitary boards and the current mindless, expensive, and counter-
productive "band-aid" processes and rituals that are used to
obscure its inherent problems.
Although changing the corporate law will not likely be
required to introduce reform,223 this view is not without dissenters.
Consider that the Revised Model Business Corporations Act of the
United States and "state corporation statutes do not contemplate
two-board systems"--thus, reform would require changes in state
corporation law.224 Australian federal and state laws likewise do
not contemplate dual boards, but this does not deny their
creation.22-
219 John Pound, Beyond Takeovers: Politics Comes to Corporate Control, HARV.
BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 83, 91 [hereinafter Pound, Takeovers].
220 See BETH GIVENS, CITIZENS' UTILITY BOARDS: BECAUSE UTIfLIES BEAR
WATCHING (1991) (describing the operation of such boards in the United States)
[hereinafter UTILITIES]; see also Dallas, supra note 93, at 97 (advocating the need for
both a "dual board" and a "board ombudsperson").
221 L. Donaldson & J.H. Davis, Boards and Company Performance-Research
Challenges the Conventional Wisdom, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE: AN INTL REV. 149, 151-
60(1994).
222 J. Brewer, Editorial, CORP. GOVERNANCE Q., Mar. 1996, at 1. The Central
Bank of New Zealand is governed in this manner.
223 See Lipton et al., supra note 80, at 1163.
224 Dallas, supra note 93, at 130.
225 For an example of a dual board that the author established see infra fig. 9 app.
at 164.
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In any event, governments could, and should, use
privatization 26 and corporatization of government departments227
to provide role models of compound boards. These situations could
be used to demonstrate to the private sector the processes
necessary to provide directors with the will, power, and knowledge
to add value for shareholders and protect shareholders and
stakeholders from mismanagement and/or appropriation of
value.228 In this way, corporations would become more competitive
while reducing the role and cost of government monitoring and
regulation.229
Self-regulation provides competitive advantages while
privatizing the cost of government regulation.230  The existing
system can corrupt management and directors, and also impede
corporate performance and competitiveness. 231 Corruption is an
inherent feature of unitary boards because it provides directors
with excessive powers in many areas and absolute power in
managing their own conflicts of sef-interest.232 As power corrupts
and absolute power corrupts absolutely, it is no wonder that many
companies either indulge CEOs with excessive compensation,
and/or either underperform or fail from mismanagement or
corruption. 233  The solution is simple--introduce a division of
power to create checks and balances.234 Only in this way can
management and directors systematically obtain the knowledge,
will, power, and capability to excel. 235
To provide directors with the knowledge to act, directors need
a system for obtaining inside expert information from sources
226 See Turnbull, Flaws and Remedies, supra note 95; Turnbull, Competitiveness,
supra note 16, at 80-86.
227 See PATHWAYS, supra note 211.
22 See generally Turnbull, Competitiveness, supra note 16.
= See id. at 82 (discussing how establishment of independent supervisory boards
could both "allow simpler and more effective corporate laws and... reduce the cost of
both external and internal governance to enhance competitiveness").
230 See generally Turnbull, Self-Regulation, supra note 8.
231 See Turnbull, Competitiveness, supra note 16, at 82.
232 See generally Turnbull, Self-Regulation, supra note 8.
233 See id.
234 See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 1173, 1185; Carol Goforth, Proxy Reform as
a Means of Increasing Shareholder Participation in Corporate Governance: Too Little,
But Not Too Late, 43 AM. U. L REV. 379, 416-18 (1994) (reporting the high
compensation of executives and the SEC's revised disclosure requirements for reporting
executive pay).
235 See Turnbull, Competitiveness, supra note 16; see also supra note 233.
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other than management. 236 For directors to obtain the will to act,
they need to be appointed on a basis that secures their board
position independently of management or even a controlling
shareholder.237 To provide directors with the power to act, an
independently appointed watchdog board with veto power is
required.238 To provide directors with the capability to act, their
roles, duties, and responsibilities need to be simplified. Only with
a compound board can all these objectives be achieved on a
systemic basis.239
The centralization of corporate power in a single board is the
biggest governance problem for both minority shareholders and
other stakeholders, especially when the firm has excessive market
power with suppliers and/or customers.24° The next biggest
problem is the view that a majority of directors should be
independent.241 It is in the self-interest of management, and those
wanting prestigious sinecures, to promote the idea that a majority
of directors should be from outside of the company so as to be
"independent." This approach protects management in two ways:
(i) it nearly always insures that the outside directors have little or
no corporate or industry-specific knowledge to challenge
management; and (ii) it makes directors captive to management
for information and consequently means that they lose their
independence. 242 In the end, so-called independent directors are
incapable of providing meaningful oversight.
It has been said that "[e]mpirical evidence corroborates the
frequent weaknesses of the board mechanism absent a potential
threat of pressure from shareholders, despite the many attempts
by the SEC, the New York Stock Exchange, and other
organizations to enforce adequate board conduct."2 In addition,
the suggestion that "boards should be vigorous and that
shareholders should therefore remain passive is similar to the
236 See Turnbull, Corporate Governance, supra note 3.
237 See id.
238 See id.
239 See id.
240 See generally Turnbull, Competitiveness, supra note 16 (discussing the inherent
problems with unitary boards).
241 See G.P. Stapledon & Jeffrey Lawrence, Board Composition, Structure and
Independence in Australia's Largest Listed Companies, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 150 (1997)
(discussing corporate governance as it relates to Australian boards of directors).
242 See id.
243 Pound, supra note 134, at 1062.
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suggestion that democracy could work well without elections."24
Thus, the appointment of "independent" directors cannot and
should not be relied upon to protect investors. 245
A. Providing Directors with the Knowledge to Act-The
Stakeholder Council
Other than advising management, perhaps the most
important function served by directors is the hiring and firing of
management.246 As courts and others are now beginning to
recognize, directors cannot carry out their fiduciary duty to the
shareholders with the requisite vigilance and due diligence when
limited to the information provided by management.247 Directors
also cannot reliably obtain expert information, independent of
management, via occasional visits to operating facilities and
meetings with customers. 248 Such visits and meetings may not be
conducive to obtaining unbiased information because many of the
people involved in this process may be either obligated, or loyal to
management.249 The need for corporate takeovers to improve
efficiency, however, would be avoided if directors could obtain the
same timely and comprehensive information on inefficiencies that
may be made available to an acquirer.250
Shareholders have a right to expect a director to put in place
processes to systematically collect and review informed expert
evaluations of management, independent of management-
otherwise, why have a board? It would be simpler and cheaper,
after all, for management to merely appoint an advisory committee
or consultants. If directors are to lead and motivate management,
however, they must be able to authoritatively contest the views of
management and expose the tenure of management to market
forces. It is far more efficient and effective for corporate control to
be exercised through the boardroom than through the stock
market.
244 Id. at 1063.
245 Despite the ineffectiveness of independent directors, the Reserve Bank of
Australia requires the appointment of such directors to the boards of licensed banks as
part of their prudential requirements.
246 See generally Stapledon & Lawrence, supra note 241.
247 See id.
248 See Turnbull, Corporate Governance, supra note 3, at 180-205.
249 See id.
2so See id.; Pound, supra note 134, at 1017-35.
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John Pound has described at length the efficiency of creating
competition for corporate control through the boardroom rather
than through the market.251 Pound maintained that a "political
model" of corporate governance "represents a more sustained and
organic approach to governance than the highly disruptive and
episodic" one driven by takeovers. 252 Pound further stated:
[Tihe ongoing, incremental monitoring generated within the
political model of corporate governance avoids a series of costs
associated with takeovers. It obviates both the need to pay
huge fees to intermediaries for brokering the sale of assets and
the need to arrange financing or impose a new financial
structure on the corporation in order to remedy problems that
are in reality based on operating policies. Perhaps the most
significant savings associated with the political model is that it
avoids the costly cycle in which new owners buy the corporation
only to make serious mistakes of their own and be forced to sell
the corporation to a new set of owners. 253
This argument suggests that it is in the national interest to
introduce what Pound describes as the threat of "insurgency" to
management.254 In order for independent directors to obtain
expert information from sources other than from management to
monitor and even challenge management, they need to establish
advisory councils elected by strategic stakeholders such as
customers, suppliers, and employees.255 In Japan, a Keiretsu
council carries out this function.256 In Mondrag6n, feedback
information and control from strategic stakeholders are achieved
through the Relationship Association, or Group,257 which is
251 See Pound, Takeovers, supra note 219, at 83; Pound, Address, supra note 206;
Pound, supra note 134, at 1003-71.
252 Pound, supra note 134, at 1032.
253 Id. at 1031.
254 See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text.
255 See Turnbull, Corporate Governance, supra note 3, at 180-205. "In 1963, the
Stanford Research Institute defined... stakeholders [as] 'those groups without whose
support the organisation would cease to exist.' This class of stakeholders [is] described
as ... 'strategic stakeholders' as strategic issues concern the ability of a firm to exist."
Id. (quoting same).
256 See infra fig. 12 app. at 168. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe,
Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and
Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871 (1993) (discussing corporate governance
and monitoring management performance and comparing independent directors with
the Japanese keiretsu).
257 See infra fig. 12 app. at 168; see also WJAAIAM FOOTE WHYTE & KATHLEEN
KING WHYTE, MAKING MONDRAG6N 205-07 (1988).
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constituted somewhat like a Keiretsu. In some hybrid
cooperatives, stakeholder participation is built into the
composition of the supervisory board.
25 8
A Keiretsu council may meet monthly or even weekly.25 9 Its
members are the chief executives of supplier and customer
companies as well as representatives of the lead banker and
trading house.260 These strategic stakeholders have access to
inside expert information independent of management. 261 In this
way, a Keiretsu council can access information that may not even
be available to management in order to provide management with
loyal opposition in the manner of a "shadow cabinet."2 62
Consequently, the council is able to further its goal of improving
corporate performance.
Corporations in Anglo countries lack the processes described
above and, as such, also lack the corresponding competitive
advantages. 263 No change in corporate law is required for a
company to establish advisory stakeholder councils elected by
customers, suppliers, and employees. 26 Stakeholder councils are
required so that independent directors may add value by carrying
out their intended performance role. Their introduction in the
private sector could be left to market forces, but their
establishment in public sector firms needs to become a matter of
policy. In the public sector arena, stakeholder councils provide a
political way of improving both competitiveness and self-regulation
without the need for privatization. Privatization of public
monopolies without stakeholder involvement could be counter-
258 See Tumbull, Innovations, supra note 168, at 172-73, 178 (describing the
makeup of hybrid cooperatives, including the existence of operational stakeholders as
part of the supervisory board); Turnbull, Self-Regulation, supra note 8; see also infra
fig. 4 app. at 159.
259 See Turnbull, Self-Regulation, supra note 8 ("The CEO's of each strategic
stakeholder meet monthly, and sometimes even weekly, as a Keiretsu Council."). See
generally NICHOAS DIm5DALE AND MARTHA PREVEZER, CAPITAL MARKE AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1994) (stating that keiretsu groups are organizations that
engage in monthly meetings of top management).
20 See supra note 256 and accompanying text. See generally Gilson & Roe, supra
note 256 (discussing the makeup of the keiretsu).
261 See Turabull, Self-Regulation, supra note 8 ("One advantage of the keiretsu
architecture is that the controlling shareholders obtain expert inside information,
independent of management, on the performance of management.").
262 Pound, Takeovers, supra note 219, at 91.
263 See infra tbls.11, 12 app. at A-11,A-12.
264 See infra app. A at 153; fig. 16 app. at 172-73; see also supra notes 223-25 and
accompanying text
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productive. Government regulation, therefore, must be introduced
to replace regulation by the market in the public arena.
B. Providing Directors With the Will to Act-Cumulative Voting
The lack of will to act is a problem in the governance of
corporations in the United States.265 This problem can be reduced
through the use of cumulative voting and the establishment of
independent watchdog boards to nominate directors. Cumulative
voting allows the composition of the board to reflect the
composition of the shareholders and minority interests.266 The re-
election of directors would depend upon their disclosing to the
watchdog board any self-dealing by their colleagues that could
affect the interest of shareholders. The existence of a watchdog
board increases the will to act because a director can now blow the
whistle privately without the odium of making the matter public.
A watchdog board in the form of a corporate senate, discussed
below, is able to represent minority interests because it is elected
on the basis of one vote per shareholder instead of one vote per
share.267 This would not appear to be the case with conflict boards,
which seek to overcome conflicts of loyalty by having an
ombudsperson appointed.268
With cumulative voting, all directors are elected each year and
each share obtains as many votes as there are board vacancies.269
Shareholders can distribute the votes of each share over a number
265 See Edward V. Regan, The Will to Act, Report of the Sub-Council on Corporate
Governance and Financial Markets to the Competitiveness Policy Council (1993).
266 See infra fig. 13 app. at 169; Sanjai Bhagat & James A. Brickley, Cumulative
Voting: The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights, 27 J.L. & ECON. 339, 339-40
(1984) [hereinafter Voting Rights] (stating that empirical study has revealed that
cumulative voting is important in proxy fights that tend to benefit shareholders);
Gordon, supra note 18, at 127 (revealing that cumulative voting is a vehicle for
proportional board representation of significant shareholder minorities); Bernard Black
and Reineier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1911, 1912, 1916 (1966) (stating that cumulative voting allows for the election of
outside directors who represent shareholder interests).
267 See George Freeman & Patrick Green, Let Shareholders Fix Directors' Pay:
Justice in Self-Awarded Salaries, THE INDEP. (London), Feb. 9, 1995, at 18 ("Senates
are elected with one vote per shareholder"); Turnbull, Competitiveness, supra note 16,
at 80, 83 (discussing the fact that cumulative voting for senators allows minority
shareholders to be represented on the board and to act without fear of not being re-
elected).
26 See Dallas, supra note 93, at 133 (stating that the role of the ombudsperson is
to provide an outlet for whistle blowers).
269 See Voting Rights, supra note 266, at 339.
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of directors or accumulate them for one or more directors. 270 In
this way, a shareholder with ten percent of the shares can always
appoint at least one director on a board of ten people. This system
of proportional voting allows minority interests to elect directors
even if the company is controlled by a parent entity.271
When a company trades with a controlling entity, it is
essential that such transactions are subject to the scrutiny of
individuals whose board positions are not subject to the power of
those who have a conflict of self-interest. The so-called
independent directors, however, hold their board positions at the
grace and favor of the control group.272 It is unrealistic, therefore,
to expect independent directors to bite the hand that feeds them in
an effort to protect investors.273 It may even be unrealistic for an
independent director to try to protect investors if support is not
available from a majority of board members. Often, a director does
not have the power to act, even if he or she has the knowledge to
do so.274
C. Providing Directors With the Power to Act-The Corporate
Senate
Directors of a unitary board possess a number of powers that
create conflicts of self-interest and which are not needed to add
value for shareholders.27 5 This situation is unacceptable for
shareholders and should also be unacceptable for any
conscientious director. The situation should likewise be
unacceptable to any director, conscientious or otherwise, who
wants to minimize personal exposure to litigation. It certainly
should be unacceptable to regulators, stock exchanges,
governments, auditors, investors, accountants, and lawyers.
When directors are exposed to conflicts of self-interest, they
are placed in a similar position to that of an accused in a court of
270 See id.
271 See id.
272 See Dallas, supra note 93, at 114-15 (discussing a recommendation of criterion
for membership in the class of independent directors that would decrease conflicts and
increase objectivity).
273 See id.
274 See Turnbull, Self-Regulation, supra note 8. "Even if independent directors on a
unitary board have the knowledge to act, they may not have the will and power to act
because they are loyal or obligated to management and/or hold their position at the
grace and favour of management... .:Id.
275 See Turnbull, Competitiveness, supra note 16, at 82; see also infra fig. 5 app. at
160; supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
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law. Courts maintain the highest ethical standards through the
strict separation of relationships between the accused, judge, jury,
witnesses, and lawmakers.27 6  There are corresponding
relationships between company directors, auditors, investors,
independent experts, and financial reporters. 277 The existing
Anglo corporate relationships would be considered unethical and
unacceptable if considered in light of the ethical standards
required in a court of law.
To provide directors with the power to act they need the
assistance of a watchdog committee to veto actions involving
conflicts that are in the directors' self-interests but that are not in
the best interests of the company or its investors. If a watchdog
committee, or corporate senate, is to protect minority investors
against a control group, or even a parent company, it needs to be
elected on the basis of one vote per investor.278 While a senate veto
could be overturned by shareholders voting on the basis of one
share per vote, the need to raise such issues at a general meeting
would seemingly have the effect of avoiding the most blatant
frauds on the minority. The above process could also be used to
expose to market forces the excessive salaries and equity benefits
of management.
The most contentious and unavoidable conflicts of self-interest
for directors on a unitary board are their own remuneration and
reappointment, and the accounting procedures used for calculating
profits.279 Directors cannot contract out of conflicts of self-interest
by delegating these responsibilities to a board subcommittee, as
any such subcommittee must ultimately report to the board. Since
the shareholders, rather than the directors, appoint a senate, they
can use it to manage all board conflicts of self-interest. This allows
the senate to protect the reputation of directors and to simplify
their roles, duties, and personal contingent liabilities.
Conflicts of self-interest of directors can reduce shareholder
value in several ways, including direct appropriation, related party
transactions, and/or reduced competitiveness. A senate, however,
can safeguard against such losses while simultaneously reducing
276 See infra fig. 14 app. at 170.
277 See id.
278 See infra fig. 13 app. at 169; see also supra note 267 and accompanying text.
279 See Turnbull, Structure and Ethics, supra note 19 (listing examples of powers
of directors on unitary boards that cause conflicts of interest); Turnbull, Self-
Regulation, supra note 8.
[74:89
20001 CHARTERS WITH COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES 131
the role and responsibilities of directors without reducing their
power.280  The end result is that senates add value for
shareholders.
D. The Ability to Act Constructively
An additional advantage of a division of power is that the role,
responsibilities, and workload of directors are both reduced and
simplified.281 The division of corporate powers into a compound
board made up of directors, a watchdog committee or senate, and
advisory councils of committed experts introduces "distributed
intelligence" and information-processing to corporate
governance.282 By this means, compound boards, such as those
found in Mondrag6n, reduce information overload in order to
provide ordinary people with the ability to achieve extraordinary
results.283
With a compound board, the roles and responsibilities of
directors are "decomposed" and distributed to five different
centers, as with the stakeholder-controlled firms of Mondrag6n.284
This division of decision-making labor introduces a reduction in
the workload, knowledge, and responsibilities of any one
individual.285  Furthermore, it allows many more people to
participate in controlling the firm, thereby enhancing motivation
and commitment. 286
28o See Turnbull, Vacant, supra note 95, at 2-6; Turnbull, Structure and Ethics,
supra note 19, at 1-4 (discussing limited duties of corporate senates and mentioning
a correlating benefit); Turnbull, Competitiveness, supra note 16, at 80-86
(discussing generally the benefits of corporate senates over unitary boards).
28 See Turnbull, Structure and Ethics, supra note 19 ("The division of corporate
power into two boards can also be used to substantially reduce the complexity, duties,
skill and obligations of company directors."). Full text at <http://www.worldbank.org/de
vforum/ files/struc-and-eth.pdf>.
282 See Turnbull, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 140 (discussing multiple
board organization and how this system solves information problems that exist
within the unitary board structure).
283 See id. (discussing how controlling the availability of information to individuals
will increase efficiency by analogy to information-processing in computer chips).
284 See infra fig. 9 app. at 164.
285 See id.
2 See generally Turnbull, Structure and Ethics, supra note 19.
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E. Other Advantages of Compound Boards
1. Improved Competitiveness
The division of power among stakeholders introduces checks
and balances to minimize and control conflicts, corruption, and the
corrosion of competitiveness. 287 They increase the variety in both
the information and control systems of firms to improve
competitiveness and self-regulation.288 While corporate senates
introduce a division of power to minimize corruption, stakeholder
councils provide information to improve performance. 28 9 In other
words, corporate senates are required for corporate controllers to
carry out their conformance roles, while stakeholder councils are
required to allow directors to systematically carry out their
performance duties. By controlling corruption, senates can also
increase performance. 290
2. Self-Regulation
Stakeholder councils, which share power as well as
information, could be used to protect consumers, employees, and
suppliers against abuse and exploitation. In this way, stakeholder
councils can reduce the need for laws, regulations, and
bureaucracies in order to protect customers, employees, and
suppliers.291 Stakeholder Councils can be especially useful for
firms that have a monopoly or hold a dominant market position.
The feedback information provided by such strategic stakeholders
also provides a way to improve competitiveness. 292 Thus, there are
strong arguments for governments to require firms to adopt
corporate charters or constitutions that share power with their
stakeholders, 293 and then leave the firms to regulate themselves.
287 See id. One way of establishing a dual board is with a corporate senate. See id.
"It is in the self-interest of all parties, except rogues, to support the introduction of
corporate senates." Id.
m See id.
289 See id.; Turnbull, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 140 (discussing how
power results from its availability and strategic distribution).
290 See Turnbull, Competitiveness, supra note 16, at 85-86.
291 See generally Turnbull, Self-Regulation, supra note 8 (stating that unitary
boards increase the need for governmental regulation and discussing the differences
that could develop from the introduction of dual boards and stakeholder councils).
292 See generally UTILITIES, supra note 220.
293 See generally Turnbull, Self-Regulation, supra note 8 (discussing advantages of
stakeholder power in corporate governance, including decentralizing information,
protecting minority stakeholder interests, decreasing conflicts of interest, and
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3. Changing the Role of Government
Direct intervention and "imprinting" the constitutions of social
institutions can improve self-regulation and provide operating
advantages. 294 This is consistent with the idea that corporate law
in emerging markets should be created anew, using the mistakes
and failures of more established markets as guideposts so as to
create a better scheme of corporate law.295
4. Improving the Extent and Quality of Democracy
The creation of one or more stakeholder associations for
influential social institutions, be they in the private or public
sector, provides a way to extend and deepen citizen participation
and democratic processes. 296
5. Establishing a Control Process for "Democratizing the
Wealth of Nations"
The compound board illustrated in Figure 16297 provides a
way to control the process for legitimating stakeholder
participation in control with stakeholder participation in
ownership.293 Tax incentives are required to provide the attraction
for firms and investors to change their corporate charters, and to
transfer their property rights to stakeholders without charge.299 In
this way, tax incentives can be used to "amplify regulation" and
"imprint" corporate charters for all types of firms on a voluntary
basis. 00
improving the overall performance of the entity); PATHWAYS, supra note 211, at 99-
109; Turnbull, Democracy, supra note 4, at 321-60.
294 See generally Gore, supra note 15 (explaining the importance of incorporating
science and technology into our modem methods of distributing intelligence).
295 See generally Black & Kraakman, supra note 116 (discussing an innovative
approach to corporate law in emerging markets that focuses on voluntary compliance
with such laws and increased communication betveen managers and stockholders).
293 See Turnbull, Democracy, supra note 4; Turnbull, Flaws and Remedies, supra
note 95; UTI.ITIE, supra note 220.
297 See infra fig. 16 app. at 172-73.
298 See Shann Turnbull, Re-Inventing Corporations, 10 HUi. SYS. MGMT. 169
(1991).
299 See generally Turnbull, Stakeholder Governance, supra note 140, at 11-23;
Turnbull, Democracy, supra note 4; Shann Turnbull, Democratizing the Wealth of
Nations, COMiPANY DIRECTORS ASSOCIATION OF AUSTRALIA (1975) [hereinafter
Turnbul, Wealth]. Full text available at <http/cog.kent.edu/Author/Author.htm>;
Shann Turnbull, Time Limited Corporations, 9 ABACUS: A J. OF BUS. AND ACCT. STUD.
28(1973).
300 Turnbull, Wealth, supra note 299.
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6. Distributing Monopoly Control and Profits to Those Subject
to Exploitation
The transfer of ownership and control from firms and
investors to others without compensation has now become
accepted practice for financing infra-structure projects.30'
Examples of such transfers include the Sydney Harbor Tunnel and
the Hong Kong Harbor Tunnel, and projects associated with the
supply of water and electricity in Australia and the United
Kingdom.302 Investment institutions find the limited life returns
from these Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) projects
competitive with investments in perpetual claims.30 3 In most
cases, residual ownership reverts back to the government. There
are arguments that even better returns and lower risk can be
achieved from limited life investments by gradually transferring
ownership and control to their strategic stakeholders. 30 4  In
addition, any monopoly profits would be shared with those subject
to exploitation. By these means, the scope, size, and costs of laws
and regulatory agencies concerned with anti-trust, anti-
competition, fair trading, and monitoring trade practices could be
substantially reduced.305
7. Assuring Auditor Independence
There have been many failures by auditors to protect
investors. These failures, which are documented in the academic
literature, describe the differences between their role and reality
as the "audit expectation gap."30 6 In order to obtain value from
auditors, they need to be controlled by a watchdog committee,
independent of both directors and management. 30 7 Otherwise,
301 See Peter Montagnon, Export Finance 2: Revival in the Project Market, FIN.
TIMES (London), June 1, 1989, at II (noting that "build-own-operate" projects, in which
"private sector sponsors . .. take on the risk and the responsibility for financing
projects," are beginning to generate significant business).
302 See id. (providing examples of such projects, including the East Harbor crossing
in Hong Kong, the Dartford Bridge, and the Channel tunnel); Shann Turnbull, Should
Ownership Last Forever?, 27 J. OF SOCIO-ECON. 341 (1998) Full text at <http'l/papers.
ssrn.com/paper.talfabstractjid=137382> (discussing various BOOT projects).
303 See Turnbull, supra note 302 (noting that BOOT projects "attract private
foreign investment on the basis that the ownership of the enterprise is transferred to
the government after an agreed period").
304 See Turnbull, Corporate Governance, supra note 3, at 180-205.
305 See id.
306 See Turnbull, Audit Committees, supra note 95, at 78-89.
307 See ROBERT I. TRICKER, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 99, 100
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when left unchecked, directors and management can, so to speak,
write and mark their own examinations. 308  Reasons why
independent auditors are ineffective with respect to unitary boards
include:309
a. the tendency for people tend to be less concerned about
harming a statistical victim than a known victim. An auditor does
not really know who will be harmed by misinformation. The
auditor, however, does know the people in the firm who would be
harmed by a negative audit;
b. the fact that the adverse consequences of a negative opinion
in an audit are immediate, e.g., loss of contract or employment;
c. the long-standing relationships auditors have with the
companies they audit;
d. the flexibility or ambiguity of reporting standards;
e. the fact that people can mislead themselves about the
nature of trade-offs and rationalize their behavior.
It is evident that the mandating of auditors to further self-
regulation is no longer effective. The objective would be better
served by authorizing a watch-dog board, like a corporate senate,
which could then choose to retain some type of independent
investigator, or not. Accounting may not always be the most
appropriate profession to provide assurance on the integrity of
information provided to investors. It may be more relevant to
appoint a risk assessor, engineer, property consultant, or geologist,
according to the nature of the business. Stakeholder councils could
also play a role in assuring the integrity of the information
reported by management.
8. Assuring Disclosure Without the Need for Accounting
Standards
Just as the presence of an auditor may provide false security,
so can adherence to generally accepted accounting standards.310
(1994) (discussing the idea of a "watch dog" that can provide independent checks).
308 See id. at 99.
30 See Max H. Bazerman et al., The Impossibility of Auditor Independence, 38
SLOAN MGMIT. REV. 89 (1997) (discussing the psychological difficulties that auditors
have in remaining impartial).
310 See Graeme W. Dean & Frank L. Clarke, Creative Accounting, Compliance and
Financial Commonsense, 7 AUSTL. J. OF CORP. L. 366, 367 (1997) (noting that
"[e]xisting accounting standards... have failed to match the admirable claims of the
leaders of the profession"); Walter P. Schuetze, A Mountain or a Molehill, Address
Before the Twenty-First Annual National Conference of the American Institute of
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Accounting standards cannot be used to provide integrity in either
the reported profit or net worth of a firm. This is because both are
subject to how management values the assets and allocates costs
and revenues over accounting periods, as noted at the bottom of
Figure 15. If judgments are to be made, then these should be done
independently of the directors responsible for the performance of
the business. This is another role for a watchdog board and
provides an illustration of the principle of amplification of
regulation. The mandating of one feature can remove the need to
regulate or specify many other features in the law, regulations,
listing rules, and accounting standards.
CONCLUSION
A. Compounds Boards and Stakeholder Control
Empirical evidence suggests that the existence of non-trivial
stakeholder-owned firms, which are not professional partnerships,
is dependent upon the presence of compound boards.311 This is
especially remarkable in the United States and the United
Kingdom, where unitary boards are the norm,312 and strongly
suggests that worker ownership is not sustainable with a unitary
board.31 3 When a hierarchy becomes non-trivial in a worker
controlled firm with a unitary board, the power differential
between workers and management can lead to misuse of power
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) (Jan. 11, 1994), in NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS, Jan.
17, 1994, at 4 (referring to proposals by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants as "wrong" and "incredible").
311 See generally PAUL BERNSTEIN, WORKPLACE DEMOCRATIZATION: ITS INTERNAL
DYNAMICS (1980) (discussing an international survey of employee-owned firms with
compound boards and an analysis of their successes).
312 See Thomas J. Andr6, Jr., Some Reflections on German Corporate Governance:
A Glimpse at German Supervisory Boards, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1819, 1821 (1996) (noting
little movement in Germany towards the establishment of unitary boards, which are
common in the United States and Britain); Jonathan Charkham, The American
Corporation and the Institutional Investor: Are There Lessons From Abroad?, 1988
COLUnL BUS. L. REV. 765, 766 (1988) (discussing the common usage of unitary boards
in U.S. and British corporate systems).
313 See infra fig. 5 app. at 160 (supporting the view that worker-ownership is not
sustainable with a unitary board because of inherent conflicts of interest).
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and/or loss of trust.314 The problem is exacerbated with the
process of director and/or CEO succession.315
If employee control is not viable with respect to unitary
boards, then there is an immediate need to develop compound
boards in the United States for the growing number of firms
controlled by Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOPs). 16 Tax
incentives introduced in the United States since the 1970s,317 and
more recently in the United Kingdom, have led to "employees...
becoming the largest voting block in many U.S. publicly traded
corporations."318 In fact, employee-owned firms are growing at
such a rapid rate that of the "7,000 companies listed on American
stock exchanges about 1,000 firms are at least 10% employee
held."319 As any one institution typically holds less than 5% of a
firm, employees now represent the most significant control group
in the United States.3 20 This trend is also occurring in other Anglo
countries such as the United Kingdom and Australia.321
B. The Costs of Compound Boards
No additional fees accrue to any of the individuals appointed
to compound boards utilized by the stakeholder-controlled firms at
Mondrag6n or any of the worker-controlled firms analyzed in an
314 See Alan Hyde, In Defense of Employee Ownership, 67 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 159,
163-64 (1991) (noting that worker ownership can increase trust and be positive for firm
productivity).
315 See id.
316 See Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts:
Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1220
(1991) (stating that one way to protect employees from displacement is for unions to
encourage employee ownership of corporations). The "number of Employee Stock
Ownership Plans (ESOPs) has escalated, and experts expect the number to continue to
rise." Id. (footnote omitted).
317 See generally JOSEPH RAPHAEL BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: REVOLUTION OR
RIPOFF? (1988) (discussing the positives and negatives associated with employee-
ownership); see also WILLIAMSON, CAPITAUISM, supra note 50, at 325 (noting that
ESOP's "currently enjoy tax advantages").
318 Turnbull, Corporate Governance, supra note 3; see also G. Tseo, Employee Stock
Ownership Firms, Popular Cooperatives, and the Forgotten Model of Mondragdn, 29 J.
OF COOP. STUD. 1, 65-92 (1996).
319 Tseo, supra note 318.
320 See A Skeptical Look at Employees Share Schemes, AUSTL. FIN. REV., Sept. 4,
1999, at 20 (noting that in the United States during 1985, "10,000 companies had
granted stock to more than 10 million employees," and since then "the number of US
workers who own a direct stake... has soared" due to "internet start-ups giving their
employees stock").
321 See Turnbull, Corporate Governance, supra note 3 (noting that this trend is
developing in Australia).
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international survey.322 All members of these compound boards
only receive their normal pay. As such, with the exception of non-
executive directors, there are no additional costs. Consequently,
employee-controlled compound boards can operate more
economically then unitary boards.
Two types of costs of worker control have been identified in a
collective choice mechanism: "First, there are the costs of
inefficient decisions. Second, there are the costs of the decision-
making process itself."323 It has been noted that "participation in
governance of the firm through democratic institutions appears in
fact to be its greatest liability."3 24  Worker control can be
outstanding, as at Mondrag6n, when an appropriate corporate
charter is in place. 325 The utility of the alternative framework
presented above can be empirically evaluated from its ability to
provide design criteria for establishing appropriate charters. 326
Non-executives could be involved with both corporate senates
and stakeholder councils. 327  A fee may not be needed for
senators.328 Instead, lead investors would contribute their services
to protect their investment. This approach is similar to the
involvement undertaken by venture capitalists in the firms in
which they have a financial stake.329 Likewise, U.S. organizations
that utilize citizen utility boards have not had to pay the costs
associated with the boards because funds are "donated" by the
322 See generally BERNSTEIN supra note 311.
3- Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOP's, Law Firms,
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1781 (1990) (explaining
that a larger number of participants in a decision making mechanism results in greater
cost to make the decision).
324 Id. at 1816.
325 See Turnbull, Innovations, supra note 168, at 167-80 (explaining the
governance of Mondrag6n firms and its underlying principles).
326 See supra notes 323-25 and accompanying text.
327 See infra app. A at 152 (noting that "[amny shareholder may nominate himself
or herself for election to the senate"). But see William Lewis & David Wighton, Tories
Spoiling for Fight With Labour On Corporate Governance, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug.
26, 1996, at 6 (discussing the Tories' attack on Labour's suggestion that companies
appoint stakeholders, such as staff, as non-executive directors).
328 See infra app. A at 150 (stating that during the last ten years, no fees have
been paid to any of the persons appointed as Senators of JAC Tractor Limited).
329 Salaries, however, are recommended by some commentators. See Ayub Mehar,
Dividend and Corporate Governance, BUS. RECORDER, Oct. 21, 1999, at 2 (stating that
salaries and benefits for corporate senators "should be correlated with the net profit of
a company" and that "higher limit[s] ... can be imposed in a manner mentioned for...
the Venture Capitalists Ordinance for... funds managers").
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customers at the rate of $3 to $10 per year.330 A borrower's
association of a major Australian bank, and users of a major
Australian telecommunications firm, also donated the costs of
running their associations to further their interest as stakeholders.
All of the above examples involve retail customers who accept
90% or more of "free-riders" who do not participate. There is,
however, evidence that even when only 10% of stakeholders donate
funds, they can more than recover their costs in savings from lower
prices. Moreover, the investors can also obtain higher returns
through management being provoked into becoming more
accountable and efficient.331  The incentive for industrial
stakeholders to participate in the governance of their supplier or
customer is much greater. The cost of stakeholder councils is then
likely to be negligible with regards to the possibility of producing a
direct net savings by exposing any excessive costs of remunerating
directors and the CEO.
Corporate senates would reduce the need for directors to meet
as audit, remuneration, and nominating committees. 32
Attendance at such meetings is often rewarded with additional
fees.333 The more directors are paid, the more they have to lose by
becoming whistle blowers, thus risking their re-appointments.
The less people are paid, the greater their incentive to protect the
common interest of other stakeholders. Common sense dictates
that the directors can lose the will to act if they have too much to
lose.
The economy and viability of a corporate senate for a small,
and even unlisted, company has been demonstrated by JAC
330 See GIVENS, supra note 220, at 21.
331 See id.
332 See Goforth, supra note 234, at 397, 437-38 (noting that while current law does
not require the use of nominating committees, surveys of large public corporations
show their widespread use as well as the use of independent audit, nominating, and
compensation committees); Donald E. Pease, Outside Directors: Their Importance to the
Corporation and Protection from Liability, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 25, 31 (1987) (noting
that audit, compensation, and nominating committees are critical in the context of
appointing outside directors); Stapledon & Lawrence, supra note 241, at 162
(discussing how audit, remuneration, and nomination committees have
"institutionalised [sic] the role of independent directors as sovereign in situations
where the interests of the executive management" conflict with the interests of
shareholders).
333 See Causeway Explains Renumeration Hike, STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 1, 1992, at 47
(noting that Causeway Investment Ltd. reported a "$19,000 director's fee for an Audit
Committee member").
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Tractor Limited.334 The survival of the company could not have
been maintained without the senate to attract and reduce the cost
of funds. Stock exchanges that mandate the establishment of
audit, remuneration, and nomination committees as a listing
requirement are adopting a more expensive and less effective way
to protect investors.3 5  Senates offer superior protection,
competitive advantages, and reduced costs.
C. Building a Self-Governing Society
The principle of amplification 36 of regulation essentially
means that, to create a self-governing society, self-governance
needs to be built into even the smallest institutions. One of the
conditions for social institutions to become self-governing is that
they possess a division of power.33 7 A division of power similar to
that found in the U.S. Constitution needs to be written into the
charters of all social institutions.338 In other words, compound
boards become a condition precedent for introducing self-
governance into firms and other organizations, be they in the
private or public sector.
Another condition for social institutions to become self-
governing is that their control must be shared with those people,
groups, or enterprises, known as stakeholders, who can or may be
affected by its operations.339 Stakeholder governance then also
becomes a condition precedent for self-governance. The building of
334 See infra app. A at 153 (discussing the history of JAC Tractor Limited and
details of its corporate senate plan); see also Freeman & Green, supra note 267 (noting
that the author "has successfully introduced 'Corporate Senates' "to Australia).
335 See Francis T. Vincent, Jr., Corporate Governance: Measures and Mythology, 9
DEL. J. CORP. L. 572, 572 (1984) (speaking of the New York Stock Exchange's objection
to the AIL's corporate governance recommendations with respect to disinterested
directors, monitoring models, and audit committees despite the exchange having
previously made similar recommendations as "guidelines").
336 See ASHBY, CYBERNETICS, supra note 15, at 265-67.
337 See Turnbull, World Governance, supra note 17.
338 See U.S. CONST. art. I-III (defining each branch of government and their
respective powers); see also ROBERT I. TRICKER, INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 99 (1994) (discussing the "responsibility of the board... [in] providing
independent checks and balances").
339 See Simon Holberton, Why They Do it Better in Japan, FIN. TIMES (London),
Jan. 24, 1991, at 20 (reviewing W. CARL KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS: THE GLOBAL
CONTEST FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (1991)) (alluding to the inclusiveness of the
stakeholder approach, which includes banks, employees, customers, and investors). But
cf. Patrick Minford, Economic View: Uncle Sam Shows How to Run a Rich Country,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 18, 1999, at 26 (noting that the United States "is
showing the world how a rich country should be run").
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a self-governing society would lead to the creation of a "stakeholder
economy."340 It is through the involvement of stakeholders that
firms, and organizations in general, can obtain requisite variety in
both information (Shannon's Law)341 and control (Ashby's Law)342
in order to obtain operating advantages and to become self-
governing.3 43 Shared control, in turn, requires a corporate charter
with appropriate divisions of power,3 44 which in turn reduces the
information-processing load of participants. 345 In firms, the
processing of information economizes transaction costs.
The competitive advantages of appropriate involvement of
stakeholders in the governance of firms are illustrated by the
Mondrag6n and Japanese Keiretsu systems, and in a developing
body of literature on network forms of organization.346 The
competitive advantages of network relationships can be explained
by the cybernetic framework of analysis outlined above.347 The
establishment of stakeholder associations composed of employees,
customers, suppliers, and members of the host communities can
also be used by firms to add value, minimize mistakes, and reduce
340 Blair Raises the Stake, ECONOIST, Jan. 13-19, 1996, at 53, 53 (discussing the
implications of Tony Blair's desire to transform Britain into a "stakeholder economy").
341 See Claude E. Shannon, Communications Theory of Secrecy Systems, 28 BELL
SYS. TECHNICALJ. 656,656-715 (1949).
342 See generally ASHMY, CYBERNTICS, supra note 15.
'4 See id.; Shannon, supra note 341.
344 See Richard M. Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate
Governance, 73 CAL. L REV. 1671, 1674-1713 (1985) (detailing numerous obstacles to
shareholder participation in corporate governance). But see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1034, 1052-53 (1993) (discussing the necessity of a centralized corporate decision-
making power in management's hands for corporate business organizations to succeed);
Bevis Longstreth, Reflections on the State of Corporate Governance, 57 BROOK L. REV.
113, 114-20 (1991) (criticizing corporate governance proposals and developments that
enhance shareholder participation).
345 See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text (underscoring human limitations
on the ability to receive, store, process, and transmit information, and that institutional
arrangements, which economize the need for, and capture of, information, also
economize costs).
346 See Van Alstyne, supra note 174, at 3; see also PODOLNY & PAGE, supra note
173 (stating that "network forms of organization foster learning... provide a variety of
economic benefits, facilitate the management of resource dependencies, and provide
considerable autonomy for employees"); D.W. Craven et al., New Organizational Forms
for Competing in Highly Dynamic Environments: The Network Paradigm, 7 BRIT. J.
MGAIr. 203-18 (1996); F. J. Richter, The Emergence of Corporate Alliance Networks-
Conversion to Self-Regulation, 13 HUM. SYS. MGMTr. 19-16 (1994).
347 See supra Part IA (explaining the framework of cybemetics).
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operating risks.348 Many network relationships create a holonic
architecture. 349 Some of the advantages of a network relationship
that reflect a holonic architecture are leverage; speed; flexibility;,
shared risk; independence; faster growth; increased profits;
sustainable customers; reduced capital requirements; quick failure
recognition; and an increased ability to handle inevitable
change.3 50 Compound boards provide the basis for establishing
holonic network relationships both within and between firms.3 51
Unitary boards represent a flawed system for the governance
of both publicly traded corporations and public sector
organizations.352 Because the United States has the most powerful
and successful economy in the world, the world is blindly adopting
its inherently flawed corporate governance system.353 This is
supported by the belief that markets provide the most effective
form of self-regulation even though the ethnocentric U.S. theory of
the firm posits that firms exist because markets fail.354
348 See generally Jacqueline Bhabha, The Right to Community, 64 U. CIE. L. REV.
1117, 1126 (1997) (reviewing ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS (1996))
(noting the success of "the worker cooperative experiment at Mondrag6n" in Northern
Spain); William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1370
(1991) ("The Mondrag6n model has inspired a variety of reform and promotion efforts,
such as those of the Industrial Cooperative Association of Somerville, Massachusetts,
and is reflected in recent state legislation designed to facilitate cooperatives.").
349 See Holonic, supra note 182.
350 See Sondra Harding, John Mathews, Catching the Wave: Workplace Reform in
Australia, 17 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 589, 590 (1996) (book review) (stating that according to
Mathews, holonic organizations "bring together tools, logistics, and people in a flexible,
integrated whole," and that organizations, "coupled with negotiated change processes,
will be the successful organizations of the future"); PATRICK MCHUGH ET AL., BEYOND
BUSINESS PROCESS REENGINEERING TOWARDS THE HOLONIC ENTERPRISE (1995).
351 See infra fig. 8 app. at 163 (presenting a hierarchy of complex subjects); see also
Turnbull, Governing Society, supra note 57 (manuscript on file with author) (proposing
that compound boards can provide operating advantages to organizations with complex
operations or when operating in a complex environment); fig. 7 app. at 162 (analyzing
the ability of hierarchies to control, regulate, or govern).
352 See CHANDLER, supra note 16, at 41 (discussing the weakness of a centralized
corporate structure); see also Buxbaum, supra note 16, at 44 (noting the limitations of
unitary boards, which are "neither close enough to operational management to control
it effectively nor detached enough to offer a[n] [objective] perspective," and their
inability to be anything more than distant monitors of the self set goals of executive
management).
353 See Bhide, supra note 193, at 129 (emphasizing that the American economy
"nurtures market liquidity at the expense of good governance" and that "rlules that
protect investors and the integrity of markets also foster antagonistic, arm's-length
relationships between shareholders and managers").
M See Shann Turnbull, Stakeholder Cooperation, 29 J. CO-OPERATIVE STUD. 18,
18-32 (1997). Full text at <http://papers.ssrn.com>; Jeffery Atik, Complex Enterprises
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The belief by most social scientists and commentators that
self-regulation is not possible in firms and other social institutions
arises from (i) the lack of understanding regarding the inherent
flaws of unitary boards and centralized governance systems, which
deny self-governance, and (ii) the lack of social institutions with
appropriate divisions of powers to provide empirical examples of
self-regulation. This flawed understanding accounts for the
widespread belief that self-regulation can best be achieved through
markets.
An immediate way to stop the imperialism of the flawed and
unethical U.S. model of corporate governance is for all
governments and development agencies to introduce compound
boards. Compound boards provide a means of extending and
strengthening the self-enforcing model of corporate law introduced
into former socialist countries. 355  Corporatization and
privatization initiatives would provide an ideal opportunity for
lawyers to draft corporate charters that can introduce self-
governance and thus bring about competitive advantages for the
firm.
The introduction of competitive self-governing corporate
charters could also be made a condition for providing finance, as is
the case in Mondrag6n. In this way, the World Bank and other
international agencies could avoid the inherent defects of current
corporate charters and impress competitive self-governing
attributes upon both businesses and other types of social
institutions. There exists a rewarding opportunity for scholars,
lawyers, banks, investors, stakeholders, and others to initiate a
program to design corporate charters with competitive advantages
while also spreading a more enriched and efficient form of
democracy throughout the world.
and Quasi-Public Goods, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 1, 3-7 (1995) (discussing various
theories on why ordinary firms exist, and noting that the transaction cost theory
postulates that certain transactions "are more likely to be conducted efficiently within
firms than across markets," hence resulting in the theory essentially "becom[ing] a
catalogue of types of market failure").
355 See Black & Kraakman, supra note 116, at 1943-45 (arguing against a
representative democracy, under which shareholders elect a board of directors to act on
their behalf, because boards "can too easily become lazy or be captured by
management"). Instead, the authors favor the introduction of a "self-enforcing" model of
corporate governance that allocates managerial power to a board of directors, subject to
shareholder review of particular actions. See ic
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APPENDIX A
CORPORATE SENATE CASE STUDY
A. Background
Jefferson Approtrac Company Pty. Ltd. (JAC) was founded by
the author in Vermont in 1984 on behalf of a group of U.S.
investors. In 1986, JAC commenced operations in Sydney,
Australia as a privately held company. JAC was formed to
improve U.S. traction technology for vehicles operating over
uneven terrain. Its funding led to the development by a U.S.
inventor of the first Evaluation Vehicle (EV1), for which a U.S.
patent was granted.
In 1986, JAC raised over $800,000 from three Australian
family-owned companies and a publicly-traded venture capitalist.
JAC also entered into a development and manufacturing
agreement with its largest shareholder with the understanding
that the shareholder would obtain a $250,000 research and
development grant from the Australian government to contribute
to the project. The grant was conditioned on JAC acquiring the
rights to EVI's U.S. patent. JAC achieved this by issuing shares
and options to both United States and Australian parties having
an interest in the patent. When the EV1 and its U.S. inventor
arrived in Australia in 1987, the company had five Australian
corporate shareholders owing 53% of the company and twenty-two
U.S. citizens owning 47%.
JAC's board consisted of three Australians and two
Americans. An Australian engineer who had been President of the
International Federation of Consulting Engineers was Chairman
of the Board. The author was an executive director and company
secretary. Another Australian executive director oversaw
development and manufacturing contracts under the firm's largest
shareholder. One U.S. director appointed the author's wife as his
alternate. The other U.S. director was a former professor of
agricultural engineering who held many patents. An observer
representing the venture capitalist also attended board meetings
and was also a senator. The senate is discussed in detail below.
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B. The Transformation of JAC's Corporate Form
During production of EV2 in 1987, a fundamental change in
design was proposed which required that additional funds be
obtained. In order to attract additional funds from existing and
new investors, the project was re-capitalized at an extraordinary
general meeting of shareholders held on February 10, 1988. The
purpose of this meeting was to amend the company's articles of
association so as to establish a corporate senate with the power to
veto any resolution made by a director with a conflict of interest.
The amended articles of association included provisions to: (i) elect
all directors each year by cumulative voting;, (ii) allow the directors
to form stakeholder associations and stakeholder councils, subject
to approval by the senate; and (iii) require the approval of
shareholders not to pay-out any current trading profits of the
company. As a result of the meeting, the firm was transformed
into a public company which assumed the name JAC Tractor
Limited (JTL).356
One of the purposes of the above transformation, as stated in
the notice sent to JAC's shareholders seeking approval for the
above changes, was to "make management compete for new funds
on a continual basis with all other alternative investment
opportunities available to shareholders; that is, to encourage
management 'glasnost' on the future prospects of the business."357
Soon after transforming the company, the development and
manufacturing agreement with its largest shareholder was
cancelled. Use of JTL's facilities was continued, however, on a
rental basis in order to continue the development work. JTL also
hired its first employees and a CEO and obtained its own research
and development grant from the Australian government.
The success of the above changes was reflected in JTL's ability
to raise $1.1 million through the issuance of new shares. In
addition, JTL was able to attract another institutional investor as
a significant investor. In 1988, ownership of JTL by Australian
investors grew to 57% of the outstanding shares, with 43% now
held by overseas investors. Furthermore, JTL began to obtain
world-wide patents for its traction technology. After completing
EV3 in 1989, the company ceased conducting its own development
356 The articles of association for JAG Tractor Ltd. are on file with the Australian
Securities Commission (visited Mar. 25, 2000) <.http'i/www.asc.gov.au/>.
357 Id.
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work and instead began to subcontract it out. Licensing
agreements were entered into with other firms seeking to utilize
the technology. By 1997, however, the licensing agreements had
generated no revenue. In addition, the opportunity to activate the
provisions in the articles of association providing for the
establishment of stakeholder associations with stakeholder
councils had not arisen.
C. Snap-Shot of JTL's Corporate Senate
JTL's senate has three members, all of whom are elected
annually by postal voting immediately prior to the annual meeting
of shareholders. Investors can nominate themselves and include a
200-word biography with the proxies. To date, JTL has never had
a contested election. Senators are not paid a fee and generally
oversee projects not otherwise managed by directors. One U.S.
investor had to resign from the senate when he undertook fee-
paying work for the company.
No more than a dozen resolutions have been considered by the
senate in any one year. In addition, the senate has never met in
person because of logistical considerations. This necessitates that
all resolutions be voted upon by "flying minutes" that are faxed to
each senator to be voted upon. Senators located outside of
Australia base their voting decisions on phone discussions with
other officers and shareholders of the company, among other
things.
The annual report distributed to shareholders lists each
matter considered by the senate and reports how each senator
voted. A written report issued by the senate is also included in the
annual report and is included between the statutory financial
statements and the auditor's report.
For an Australian public company to change its auditor, the
Australian Securities Commission (ASC) requires that a resolution
to this effect be approved at a meeting of shareholders. In 1991,
JTL sought to save costs by replacing its large, international
auditing firm with a local firm. The existence of JTL's senate
allowed JTL to avoid the need to convene a special meeting of
shareholders to approve the change. This is so because JTL's
senate provided a basis for the ASC to exercise its discretion and
dispense with the requiroment of a shareholder meeting. As such,
JTL's senate illustrates the potential for both corporations and
regulators to save time and money. Clearly, corporate senates, if
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mandated, could simplify the law for all public companies and
collective investment funds.
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D. The Corporate Senate in Detail
CORPORATE SENATE
(ELECTED AUDIT COMMITTEE/SHAREHOLDERS COMMITTEE)
1. Three members elected by postal voting dispatched with the
notice of AGM with each shareholder having one vote per
vacancy on the senate rather than one vote per share per
vacancy.
2. Any shareholder may nominate himself or herself for
election to the senate by advising the company secretary at
any time during the year to include his name in the ballot.
Each nominee may have published up to 200 words setting
out his or her qualifications or interests in the "how to vote"
information sent out with the ballot, provided it is received
before printing of the annual report.
3. No person can nominate or remain a member of the senate:
(a) Unless they or a company of which they are a director or
secretary is the registered holder of at least 1,000
shares, or such a company has certified under seal that
the individual has been appointed its representative
pursuant to section 244(3) of the Companies Code.
(b) If they, their firm, or a company in which they have a
substantial beneficial interest, receive any material
revenues from the company. Payments of directors' fees
to a director not employed by the company will not
disqualify that person.
4. Casual vacancies will normally be filled by the nominee not
elected at the previous election who had the next highest
number of votes or, if there is no such nominee, the vacancy
may be filled by a person appointed by the remaining
members.
5. The senate is not required to meet. Resolutions may be
voted on by signing a circulated minute as being for or
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against the proposal or having no opinion. The senate may
meet with a conference call. Decisions are by a majority
vote.
6. The directors may reimburse the members of the senate for
out-of-pocket expenses incurred by reason of business
referred by the directors and details of such reimbursement
(including the allocation between members) shall be
included in the annual report for the year in which the
reimbursement was paid.
7. The senate will have the following duties and powers:
(a) To nominate the auditors and any adviser whose advice
is to be used in any report to shareholders such as:
annual accounts, proposal for the acquisition of assets
from interested parties, share issues, mergers or
takeover proposal for/or from another company.
(b) To approve any issue of shares except pro-rata bonus
issues.
(c) To determine the accounting policies to be used by the
directors in the preparation of any report to
shareholders.
(d) To approve and, if necessary, determine the form and
content of all written reports to shareholders or the
public by the directors, except those reports where the
Code requires the directors to report directly.
(e) In the case of each member of the senate, to state his or
her views on any proposal by the directors to change the
articles of the company, authorized capital, issued
capital, the number of directors, or on any proposal by
the directors in relation to any merger, take-over,
reconstruction, or the issuance of options or shares with
such views to be circulated to shareholders.
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(f) To approve all matters in which a director has a conflict
of interest, including all contracts in which a director
has an interest.
(g) To receive all minutes of directors' meetings within
seven days of their being ratified and to have the right
to inspect all documents of the company.
(h) To have the right, individually, to have their views
included in any report circulated to shareholders by the
directors, but this would not include the right to make
any reference to other views or qualifications of existing
members of the senate or those seeking election.
(i) To approve any bylaws proposed by the directors for the
management of stakeholder(s) councils.
8. Any director must disclose to the senate any matter in which
he or she has a conflict of interest.
9. The directors must report to the corporate senate no later
than every six months on all benefits and reimbursements
received by each director, or any interest in which the
Director or the spouse or child of any director has a direct or
indirect interest with details of the terms of any contracts
with the company.
10. In the event the directors cannot agree on how directors' fees
should be allocated amongst themselves, it shall be decided
by the senate.
11. The senate must approve the remuneration paid to any
director (other than the managing director) for additional
services.
12. The annual report to shareholders will include a summary of
all matters on which the views of members of the senate
have been recorded, and any other matter which has been
referred to the senate.
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13. Any shareholder will have the right to inspect any document
listed in the senate's report.
14. The directors may recommend to shareholders how to vote
for directors, subject to the inclusion of any views which
members of the senate may wish to add.
15. If members of the senate fail to respond within thirty days
after a matter has been referred to them in writing by the
directors, the consent of the senate is not required.
16. Shareholders may, by special resolution, remove any or all
members of the senate and reverse any of its decisions.
STAKEHOLDERS' ASSOCIATION(S)
The directors may form one or more associations of corporate
stakeholders as set out in the bylaws of the company to assist the
company in the procurement of goods and services and the
development, promotion, servicing, or use of the company's
products, services, or technology. Stakeholders are persons who
either provide the company with goods or services directly or
indirectly, or who are dealers, agents, customers, or users of the
company's goods or services.
Stakeholders' association(s) will be managed by the directors
who may delegate such powers as they think fit to a stakeholders
council. The establishment and operation of the stakeholders
council may be determined by the bylaws established by the
directors with the approval of the senate.
Members of the stakeholders council may attend and speak
at meetings of shareholders.
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FIGURE 1
International of Control Architecture
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FIGURE 2
Comparison Between Anglo and Japanese
Dispersed Ownership and Control Architecture
(Few, if any, independent directors on a Japanese board)
U,
Anglo
(Owners not related)
S Various banks
, not involved in
ownership or control, [except after failurel
a)
C. S!
E . Vo
I
o0
ca
i%
I
Absence of built-in double loop ownership
and control networks or top level exchange
of operational trade intelligence
Legend
S = Supplier Ownership - *
C= Customer Trade activity- - -
Source: Analytica 1992
Japanese Kelretsu
(Related party owners)
Bank or Trading
House servicing
all members 0)
Monthly and even weekly meetings of
keiretsu councils and a variety of other
networks involving executives from bank,
trading house, suppliers, and customers.
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FIGURE 3
Mondragon
ICorporacioni
ICooperatival
(M 990)J
LI
Citizens who participate in Mondrag6n activities as
customers, suppliers or community representatives
1.
Acci6n Cat6lica
(utilised 1941)
League for
Education and
Cuiture (LEC)
(1948) Hezibide
Elkartea (1988)
Support Co-ops
Education (PPS)Y---
-Initiated by LEC 1943
Social Security -. *
(Lagun-Aro) 1959
Work experience -1
(Alecop) 1966
* Retail (Eroski) 1969
- R&D (Ikedan) 1974"
Entreprenuer 1959(LKS-1990) ,
;.Bank (CLP) 1959 "
General Assemblies
of support co-ops
made uo of deleaates
National government, regional government and town councils -
Vote, appoint, delegate, manage; P.- Advise or nominate: - - - a- Start up:* ...-
Sources: CLP 1992; MCC 1992; Mollner 1991; Morrson 1991; Whyte & Vthyte 1988
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System
Excues -E~2 
Nominate I of3
ro;re; h ;;acancy -__-__-_
Work General Assembly of each of co-operative elect
place representatives to councils of their owm co-op
units of & delegates to participate in General Assemblies
10-20 of second order co-ops and Mondrag6n Congress
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FIGURE 4
CUMUAATIVE VOTING
(Preferential voting)
One vote per share for each board vacancy
Number of board positions reflects pro-rata number of
shares held
This permits representation of minority interests who can
blow the whistle on majority or other dominant
shareholders
Number of shares to be voted at meeting (V)
The minimum number of shares (X) necessary to elect a particular number of directors (N) is:
X=VNI(D+I)}+I where V is the number of shares to be voted at the meeting and D is the total
number ofdirectors to be elected.
When the board has D vacancies, then the votes (v% to nearest whole number) required to
elect a majority ofdirectors (M), or at least a single director (s%), is set out in the table below:
D 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
M 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8
v% 51 61 51 58 51 56 51 56 51 55 51 54 51
s% 26 21 18 15 14 12 11 10 9 9 8 8 7
The number of directors (N) who can be elected by a group holding X shares is given by.
N={(X-1)(D+I))/V
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FIGURE 5
Ethical structure
Court of law with all parties kept independent
WITNESSES LEGISLATURE
Information
Unethical structure
Corporate accountability with unitary board
[MTOR] Nominated & managed by directors
Aonintad by and (Judoej & employed for additional services
Directors alocate costs & revenues,
determine value of stocks, debtors &
non-current assets, and select accounting
porlcies wthin or outside standards.
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FIGURE 6
CORPORATE SENATE
Separates and manages the most important
conflicts of director self-interest
Appointed & managed by
AUDITOR senate and not permitted to
undetake services for directors
Directors allocate costs &
revenues; determine value of
stocks, debtors & non-current
assets according to procedures
established by senate/auditor
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FIGURE 7
Stakeholder Governance for Publicly Traded Firms
or Monopolies
20 ' YEARS
,eneral Meeting of Shareholders Charman
Shareholders meet at least once a year
to elect directors by preferential voting
with one vote per share. Senators elected
ht hneI v-tin nf -n veto nr invotnr
Board of Directors
8 elected by shareholders of which no
more than 3 can be executives with
iairperson of Stakeholders as 9th member
6 representives. 2 e
Executive Committee L
CEO and Department heads [
Control enterprise I
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FIGURE 8
Differences Between 'Economic' and Real People
'ECONOMIC' REAL PEOPLE
PEOPLE
1 Unlimited appetite Appetite determined and limited by the necessity of
maintaining the organism in a state of dynamic
equilibrium
2 Completely informed Reduces, condenses, summarizes (and thus necessarily
loses) information, in addition, an 'imperfect'
communications network in the environment also restricts
and attenuates the flow of information
3 Consistently orders Does not consistently order his/her preferences (i.e.,
his/her preferences changes his/her mind over time, may prefer A to B, B to C
between outcomes over but C to A
time
4 Maximizes something Attempts to optimize with respect to a large number of
(usually one thing) criteria (needs)
5 Competitive Sometimes competitive, sometimes collaborative; usually
both
6 Requires a value Requires a value system in order to provide a framework
system only in order to for the ordering of needs, the selection of information, and
provide a criterion the weighing of multiple decision criteria
against which to
maximize, e.g., profit,
utility, prestige, power
7 Not explicitly related Stands in an interactive cybernetic relationship to his/her
to the world as an community and environment and is changed as a result of
element in interactive any interaction
system and remains
unchanged as a result
of any interaction
8 No significant Differences between individuals are significant and
differences between important
individuals
9 No limits on Limited information processing capacity so prefers slow
information processing rates of change, i.e., nearly stable systems
capacity, so is
unaffected by
differences in rates of
change
10 Needs are simple and Needs are simple and many
few
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FIGURE 9
Channels of Communication and Control
(in order of evolutionary development)
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METHOD SENSORY SEMIOTIC/SIGHT VOICE/WORD PRICES
Dependent Instincts Cognitive processing of Language & Numeracy
upon: signs & symbols literacy
Basis of Individual Culturally determined For hierarchy*: Quantification of
operation perception of rules of behavior of requests & orders needs and
people's needs people and social through a chain of responses in
and responses institutions command monetary values
Examples Mother-child, Ownership, use, design of Corporations, Exchanges
kin, tribes, property & artifacts. bureaucracies & between
partnerships, Dress, behavior, tenure military individuals,
work groups, attributes in social groups and
cabals, etc. institutions - church, other
government, firms organizations in
a market
economy
Type of Intuitive and Transformation and Command and Production and
operations spontaneous change in tenure obedience exchange of
relationships of people to goods and
property or social services and
institutions negotiable
assets
Motivating Instincts Social conditioning Respect/use of Materialism
forces power
Means of Sensory Signs, symbols, aggregate Requests and Valuations,
communicating (not sight) behavior, e.g., usage, orders offers and bids
needs migration, votes, etc.
Data/sec <15 bits/sec 1,000,000,000 bits/sec 100 bits/sec 100 bits/sec
Limits of Few people & May lack operational Amount & Non monetary
communication short response or be non- accuracy of characteristics
distances directive information
Limits of Resources Requirements of minority Time of response Quality
cooperation available
Other limits Personal Not specific in servicing Lack of choice, Insensitive to
relationships needs flexibility & non-economic
sensitivity values and
needs
Benefits of Speed of Managing the quality of Precision of Speed with large
method reaction social and physical execution on a numbers,
environments large scale precision, with
sensitivity to
preferences
* For expositional convenience other forms of organizations have been omitted.
Data/sec values obtained from Cochrane (1997)
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FIGURE 10
Elements of Paradigm Shift
Framework of CoaselWilliamson, Cybernetic
analysis et al. (information
and control
architecture)
Type of social For-profit firms not Any social
institution labor managed organization,
including any
type of firm
Subject of analysis Transactions and People and
their costs quanta of
information
(bits/bytes)
Relationship of Master/servant or Any family, co-
people competitive operative,
competitive,
associative,
etc.
Social values Self-interest Any altruistic,
self-interest,
etc.
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FIGURE 11
Towards a Science of Organization
The type in bold and italics is taken from a table contained in Bellon & Niosi (1997).
Extensions to the table were developed by the author. Note 1, refer to Figure 2.
Boundary of Firms (Contribution by Bellon & Niosi) All
analysis Three divergent analysis of the firm & interfirm cooperation organizations
(Including firms)
Perspective of Transaction Resource-based Evolutionary Cybernetic
analysis Cost Economics theories offirm (RBT) theories (ET) (Science of
variable (TCE) information and
control)
1 Modes of co- Markets, Markets, hierarchies & Markets & Individuals,
operation hierarchies Associations (Ouchi hierarchies families, clans,
(Governance (Coase 1937) & 1980) teams, groups,
paradigm) hybrid associations,
organizations communities,
(Williamson, alliances,
1975) networks,
hierarchies,
markets, etc.
2 Micro- Opportunism Opportunism (Chi, Myopia (Nelson & Information
foundations 1994) & myopia Winter, 1982) & (Turnbull
(Conner, 1991) Constrained 1978b:52; 1994a;
opportunism 1994c:329;
(Hunt, 1997) 1997a)
3 Starting Costs Resources Organizations, Individuals
point of institutions (Turnbull
analysis 1978a'18;
1994a,b;1997b,e)
4 Objective Minimizing costs Maximizing resources Survival of fittest Economizing
& opportunism information
processing
(Turnbull 1997e)
5 Essence of Bundle of Bundle of assets, Bundle of Information
organization imperfectly resources & organizational processing
specified competencies routines capability
contracts (Turnbull
1997b,e)
6 Human Competitive Competitive Competitive Competitive
character (1) &/or cooperative
7 Role'of Write and Build competencies Select efficient Organizing
management enforce routines and information &
adequate strategies developing or
contracts obtaining new
knowledge
8 Firm Marginal Central Central Central
dynamics I I I _I
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FIGURE 11 (cont'd)
9 Nature of Hybrid form Research of New Means to share
alliances between complementary assets organizational tacit & other
markets and routine related to information and
hierarchies environmental knowledge
change
10 Role of families Not recognized Not recognized Not recognized Simplify
& clans information &
control through
rich tacit
knowledge and
bonding
11 Role of teams, Reduce Reduce opportunism Reduce myopia Increase
groups, opportunism and myopia and uncertainty information,
alliances, knowledge, &
communities, control while
& networks economizing
individual
information
processing and
exertion
12 Role of Reduce costs of Capture additional Dominate inputs of Condense data,
hierarchies transacting resources production intelligence, and
through markets extend control
(Turnbull 1997e)
13 Role of Organize Allocate resources Eliminate less Signals needs at
markets transactions effective the cost of
between a large organizations reducing
number of agents information,
knowledge and
meaning
(Turnbull 1997e)
14 Main role of Increasing firm Struggle for strategic Selection of Reduces info to
competition efficiency assets winners alienate
cooperation &
knowledge while
firms search for
superior
knowledge
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FIGURE 12
CORRUPTING POWERS OF A UNITARY BOARD
Directors have the power to:
1. Transfer value from the firm to themselves by:
(a) Determining their own remuneration and payments to associates;
(b) Directing business to interests associated with themselves.
2. Reduce shareholder value in the firm through:
(a) Issuing shares and options to themselves and/or associates at a discounted value;
(b) Selling firm assets to themselves or associates at a discount;
(c) Acquiring assets from themselves or associates at an inflated value.
3. Obtain other private benefits such as:
(a) The use of firm resources for their own pecuniary and non-pecuniary gain;
(b) The use of status and influence for pecuniary and non-pecuniary advantages.
4. Control independent advisers by:
(a) Awarding them work;
(b) Negotiating their fees;
(c) Determining their terms of reference to obtain support for directors' interests.
5. Control or influence the auditor b.
(a) Advising shareholders on the appointment or dismissal of the auditor,
(b) Negotiating their fees;
(c) Giving them more profitable non-audit business.
6. Determine reported profit by:
(a) Selecting basis for valuing trading assets (stock and debtors) and fixed assets;
(b) Determining the life of assets and the cost recognized for depreciation expenses;
(c) Selecting basis for recognizing revenues and costs in long term contracts;
(d) Selecting accounting policies within accepted accounting standards;
(e) Control of auditors and valuers.
7. Determine how their performance is reported by:
(a) Reporting on their own activities and deny, inhibit, or frustrate other reports;
(b) Controlling the auditor and other "independent" advisers;
(c) Controlling the conduct of shareholder meetings.
8. Retain power by:
(a) Reporting on their own performance;
(b) Filling casual board vacancies with individuals who support their own position;
(c) Nominating new directors who support them at shareholder meetings;
(d) Controlling the nomination and election procedures and processes;
(e) Controlling the conduct of shareholder meetings.
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FIGURE 13
Loss of Information In A Hierarchy
Hierarchy Information Upwards Employees
(Public or Private Sector)
Legislature Volume Correct Missing or Span of (5)
(50% lost (85% of wrong per accum
Minister/shareholder(s) level) lower meaning level totallevel)
Board of Directors 3.1% 1.4% 98.6%
Chief Executive Officer 6.3% 3.3% 96.7% 1 1
Senior Management 12.5% 7.7% 92.3% 5 6
Middle Managament 25.0% 18.1% 81.9% 25 31
Team Leaders 50.0% 42.5% 57.5% 125 156
Workers 100.00% 100.00% 0.0% 625 781
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
FIGURE 14
Evaluation of Hierarchies to Control, Regulate, or
Govern
OBJECTIVE: CONTROL (C) REGULATE (R) GOVERN (G)
(Command As for control As for regulate plus:
only) plus:
Obedience to Meaningful Adequate information for
1 commands monitoring of governed to evaluate
outcomes controllers or new
nominees for election
Accurate Accurate Independent processes for
2 communications reporting of the governed
REQUIRE- down hierarchy outcomes up (stakeholders) to reward or
hierarchy penalize controllers
MENTS Meaningful Meaningful Independent processes for
3 operational condensation of the governed to appoint
implementation reports and retire controllers
Timely Appropriate and Timely evaluations for
4 implementation timely responses rewards/penalties and
to variations review of appointment of
controllers
1 Disobedience Incomplete Incomplete information or
monitoring subject to bias from
controllers
Biases, Reporting slow, Controllers influencing or
2 distortion in biased, missing, determining their own
relaying or incomplete standards of performance
PROBLEMS commands and their own rewards and
penalties
Ineffectual Incomplete, Controllers influencing or
3 operational inadequate determining their own
implementation analysis of appointment and
variations retirement
Timeliness of Inappropriate Controllers influencing or
4 implementation responses to determining the time of
correct their own evaluation or
variations retirement
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2000] CHARTERS WITH COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES
FIGURE 15
Holarchy: Hierarchy of Complexity
Subject First level Second level Third level
Physics Particles Atoms Molecules
Chemistry Molecules Compounds Bases
Genetics Bases DNA Genes
Biology Genes Chromosomes Cells
Anatomy Cells Organs Individuals
Sociology Individuals Families Communities
Government Communities/Towns Regions/States Nations
Environment Flora & Fauna Ecological Ghaia
Systems
Engineering Components Sub-assemblies Machines
Organizations Autonomous Firms Keiretsu/
Cells/Teams Groups
Mondrag6n Work Groups Social Councils Cooperatives
firm____________ 
_
Mondrag'n Co-operative Cooperative Corporaci6n
system Groups Cooperativa
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FIGURE 16
Comparison of functions and activities: Unitary
board & Mondrag6n compound board
Unitary Board
(Source: Tricker 1994:245 & 287)
Conformance functions
Accountability
o Reporting to shareholders
OEnsuring statutes
regulatory compliance
0Reviewing audit reports
App
rew
Supervision
o Reviewing key executive
performance
o Reviewing business results
o Monitoring budgetary
control and corrective actions
Short term Long term
Mondragon Compound Board (no independent directors)
(Information source: Whyte & Whyte 1988)
Watchdog Council Supervisory board
(Invites external (Strategic stakeholders
intervention by bank and/or appoint & direct management
Group) board)
Management board I
(Allocates resources)
Work unit Social Council
(Production & appoint (Working conditions, pay
delegates to Social Council) relativities and welfare)
External
Internal
Performance functions
Strategic thinking
* Reviewing and initiating
strategic analysis
* Formulating strategy
* Setting corporate direction
ointment and
arding chief
executive
Corporate policy
Approving budgets -
" Determining compensation
policy for senior executives
o Creating corporate culture
External
Internal
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FIGURE 16 (cont'd)
Simplification of functions and activities in
compound boards
(Division of information processing labor indicated by allocation of "X")
MONDRAGON COMPOUND BOARD ANGLO
Control Watchdog Supervisory Management Board Social Council Work Unitary Board
Centers Council Board Unit
Members 3 5-8 4-6 -5-25 -10-20 -4-12
FunctionO Governance Appoint Mgt. Organize operations Worker Production & Manage
processes board welfare elect SC.
Activities Efficacy & Integrate Efficient allocation of Establish Job Direct &
integrity of strategic resources working organization & control
processes stakeholders conditions evaluation
InternaP X X X X XXXX
External X X XX
Short x X X XXX
trm*
Long x X XX
term 
_
AOmits General Assembly which elects Watchdog Council and
Supervisory board.
* Descriptions follows typology of Tricker (1994:244 & 287)
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